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1266 Civil

Defendants and Appellants.

A. C.

MouLTON and
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VERNOR E. BAIRD and MARY A. BAIRD,
His Wife, J. RuLON MoRGAN, ]. RuLON
MoRGAN, as the SurviVing Partner of the
Firm of Morgan & Morgan, a Co-Partnership, ELIZABETH j. BAIRD, BANK OF
HEBER CITY, RuLON F. STARLEY, State
Bank Commissioner of the State of Utah,
and SPENCER ·C . TAYLOR, as Examiner
in Charge of the Liquidation of the Bank
of Heber City, ARTHUR DuKE and
EuLEAN DuKE, His Wife, RAY F.
SMITH and JosiE BAIRD GILES SM-ITH,
His Wife, and J. HAROLD GILES,

1410 Civil

Defendants and Appellants.
j. R'uLoN MoRGAN,
Cross-Complainant,
vs.
RULON F. STARLEY, as Bank Commissioner
of the State of Utah, and SPENCER C.
TAYLOR, as Examiner in Charge of the
Liquidation of the Bank of Heber City,

Cross..Defendants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
Appeal From Fourth District, Wasatch County.
Honorable Dallas H. Young, Judge.
CHENEY, jENSEN, ·MARR & WILKINS, GEORGE B. STANLEY,
PAUL B. CANNON AND DELBERT M. DRAPER,
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NO. 6253

In the Supreme Court, State of Utah
jOHN A. MALIA, State Bank Commissioner
of the State of Utah, and HERBERT T AYLOR, as Examiner in Charge of ~the Liquidation of the Bank of Heber City,
Plaintiffs and Responden,ls,
vs.
]. HAROLD GILES and JosiE BAIRD GILES,
Defendants and Appellants.
A. C. MouLTON and E. DEWEY MouLTON,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
VERNOR E. BAIRD and MARY A. BAIRD,
His Wife, ]. RuLON MoRGAN, ]. RuLON
MoRGAN, as the Surviving Partner of the
Firm of Morgan & Morgan, a Co-·Partnership, ELIZABETH ]. BAIRD, BANK OF
HEBER CITY, RuLON F. STARLEY, State
Bank Commissioner of the State of Utah,
and SPENCER 'C. TAYLOR, as Examiner
in Charge of the Liquidation of the Bank
of Heber City, ARTHUR DuKE and
EuLEAN DuKE, His Wife, RAY F.
SMITH and JosiE BAIRD GILES SMITH,
His Wife, and J. HAROLD GILES,
Defendants and Appellants.
]. RuLoN MoRGAN,
Cross-Complainant,
vs.
RuLON F. STARLEY, as Bank Commissioner
of .the State of Utah, and SPENCER C.
TAYLOR, as Examiner in Charge of the
Liquidation of the Bank of Heber City,
Cross-Defendants.

1266 Civil

1410 Civil

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
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As ·stated by Appellants the case before the Court
involved two actions, ,one numbered 1266 Civil and the
other 1410 Civil, whi,ch were consolidated for tvial. The
Court made one set of Findings of F·act a·nd ·Conclusions
of Law, and one De.cree.
1

We will first take up the argument of Appellants in
case No. 1410 wherein A. C. Moulton and E. D-ewey ~foul
ton are plaintiffs. The Appellants have set forth their
statement of the issues in that ease commencing at page
3 of their brief. Before taking up each issue, we \vill
1nake a further statement of the facts and the parties
involved.
A. ·C. 1\foulton and E. Dewey Moult•on held tvvo
pron1is-sory note~s signed ·by Josie Baird Giles and J.
Harold ·Giles, each dated January 1, 1931, upon which
judgment was recovered ·on O:ctober 1, 1934 in the total
sum of ·$4;974.67, together with $370.00 attorney's fees
and $14.20 costs of C'ourt, which judgment bore interest
at the rate of 81o per annum. There was no issue as to
the validity of this judgment. The action on the promiss·ory notes \Vas ca.se N~o. 1261 ~Civil and the file in that
case is Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1. The $15,000.00 promissory
jnote executed by Vern or Baird and given to Josie Baird
~Giles wais attached by the \Sheriff in case No. 12 61 Civil
on July 7, 1934, and the promis-sory note taken int,o the
possessi~on of the .Sheriff. Execution was issued on De1

cember 19, 1934. Notice of sale wa.s posted and a eopy
was mailed to Morgan & Mor·gan on January 25, 1935
(Tr. 23, 3'5, 39, · Ab. 118, 120).

The promissory note

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
" . .a.s sold :by the Sheriff and purchased by A. C. Moulton
and E. De,vey Moulton J a.nuary 29, 193-5. The m:o:rtgage
follo\vs the note as an incident thereto. Smith v. J arrnarn,
61 Utah 125, 211 Pac. 962. The records show that a purported release of the 1nortgage .securing said promissory
note dated January 26, 19~5, 'vas rHcorded January 28,
1935 at nine ·o-'clock A. M., this release being by William
H. Baird, Attorney in Fact for Josie Baird Giles. A
ne\\~ mortgage dated J a·nuary 26, 19'35 'vas executed by
\Tern or E. Baird and recorded January 29, 193:5, for
$5,000.00 in favor of A. B. Morgan and J. Rulon Morgan,
co-partners, doing business under the firm name and
style of Jinrgan & Morgan. A warranty deed from
Vernor E. Baird to Elizabeth J. Baird dated January
28, 19a5 \vas recorded on the morning of January 29, 19'35
at 9 :05 A. M. The Power of Attorney from J·osie Baird
Giles to William H. Baird was not re-corded until J anuary 30, 1935. The Notice of Sale stated the sale "\\rould
be held January 28, 19 35 at ten :o'clock A. M. The sale
was po-stponed to January 29, 19'35 at 9:30 A. M., at
which time the sale was held. The appellants dispute
that the sale \Vas p·ostponed on the 28th or that it was
held on the morning of J a:nuary 29th. The Trial Court
so found, ho-wever, and further found that this postponement \Ya.s at the request of J. Rulon Morgan, one of the
attorneys for J os,ie Baird Giles. All of the above-mentioned d:ocun1ents vvhich \Yere recorded on January 28,
29 and 30 \Yere acknovvledged before J. Rulon Morgan
1

as Notary Public and recorded at the request of J. Rulon
Morgan or Morgan & M·organ. For the recording· infor-
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rnation see Plaintiffs' Exhibit 2 which is the ahstrac.t of
title on the property involved.
The following relationship exists he tween certain of
the parties: James R. Baird and Elizabeth J. Baird were
husband and wife, Jan1es R. Baird having died sometime
prior to 1'9 26. V ern·or E. Baird and Josie Baird Giles,
1

who is named a.s Josie Baird Giles (Smith in the Complaint, were children o.f Ja-mes R. Bai:t;"d and Elizabeth
J. Baird. William H. Baird was another son. J. Harold
Giles married Josie Baird Giles in 19'24 and 'Ya'S divorced
from her by

Interlocut~ory

Decree dated July 16, 1934.

(:See the file in ·Case .No. 1256 C:ivil which was introdueed
as an exhibit in the case). Ray F. Smith married J.o-sie
Baird Giles subsequent to her divorce, the date of the
marriage not iheing in evidence. Such n1arriage would
necessarily have been subsH>quent to J a.nuary 16, 19·3·5,
the date when the· divorce frnm J. Harold Gile's becan1e
' :final. Arthur Duke and Eulean Duke were the occupants
of the ranch at the time of the trial. :Eljzaheth J. Baird,
the mother ·of Josie Baird Giles S1nith and Vernor E.
Baird, died February 5, 1938 and J. Rulon Morgan is
the executor of her estate (Amendment to Complaint,
Afb. 38). J. R.ulon Morgan is also nan1ed as a defendant as a surviving partner of the firm of l\l,organ &
Morgan, attorneys. The $15,000.00 promissory note attached and sold by the l\{oultons -vva·s .given in October,
192.9 to Josie Baird Giles by Vern or E. Bair.d, as the
purchase price for a ran,ch S'old to Vern or by Josie. There
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is no issue in this ·case a.s to execution and delivery of
this promi·ssory note. It is admitted by the pleadings.
It is also admitted tha.t Vernor E. Baird paid $10.00 on
this note (Tr. 68, A·b. 12·6) and that he gave an additional
check as a payment thereon, which was returned for insufficient funds (Tr. 54, Ab. 123). It is undisputed that
Vernor Baird to.ok tpossession of the ranch in 1929 (Tr.
271, Ab. 170). Joe Walker ran the farm for Vernor and
remained there through the season of 1934 ('Tr. 36.5, Ab.
200).
1

One of the issues raised in this case is as to whetheT
or not the mortgage securing said promissory n.oite was
released so as to defeat the rights of the Plaintiffs. It
is ~laimed in the pleadings of the Defendants and Appellants that there was an agreement to release this
m~ortgage prior to the date of the a.ttachm.ent of sa.id \Ilote
or the levy ·of execution thereoTI. We do not admit the
materiality of any agreement to release the mortgage as
admittedly the release wa.s not given until after the note
was in the hands of the Sheriff un;der both the Writ of
Attac:hment and Writ of Exeeution. A substantial portion of the testimony ·at the trial deals, however, with
the question of whether or not there was a p·rior a.greement to release the mortgage and to convey the p·roperty

by Vern or E. Bair·d to ElizaJbeth J. Baird. The Court
found there "\vas no such agreement (Finding No. 14,
.A!b. 88). :Of .course if there was no ·such agreement the
matter is disposed of. We

hel~eve

that without question

the ·Trial Court was correct in. its finding.

Assuming,
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however, that there was such an agreement Respondents
take the position that if any such agreement was made
it wa.s ·without consideration and therefore in fraud of
ereditor·s; that any such agreement is immaterial as
it was never carried out or executed prior to the attachrnent or pri,o:r to the execution levied o:n the note; that
such agreement being oral was void as against the attaching creditor and subsequent purchaser because it
was in violation of the Statute of Frauds.
Appellants attempt to make a point of the fa·et that
when the $15,000.00 promissory note was purchased by
the Moultons the bid was only $100.00. The questioTI
of the $100.00 bid is fully dis,cussed hereafter. However,
we wish to po[nt out that at the opening of the case
counsel for Plaintiffs stated that no deficiency judgment
would be taken against Vernor BHird, that the judgment
taken would he only for the amount of the judgment by
the Moultons against Josie Baird Giles and her husband,
J. Harold Giles, and that upon the payment of such
amount the judgment against the Defendants would be
released. Of course, the fa-ct that only $100.00 was bid
for this note is no legal reason why it should not be enforced. However, since the Appellants have rarised the
question we point out fhat the Plaintiffs in case No. 1410
Civil are asking nothing except that which is owing to
them.

The proceedings are only an attempt to enforce

an honest obligation. The Appellants on the other hand
have done everything

po~ssible

to prevent the payment

of an hone-st oibligation.
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ARGUMENT REGARDING AGREEMENT TO RELEASE MORTGAGE,
THE CONSIDERATION FOR SU·CH RELEASE AND CONVEYAN·CE BY VERNOR E. BAIRD TO ELIZABETH J. BAIRD.
(See pages 27 to 39 of Appellants' Brief) .

. .\ppellants elaim that son1etime in the year 1933
an agreement 'Yas made between Josie Bnird Giles,
Vernor E. Baird and :E;Jlizabeth J. Baird, their Mother,
that Josie would release the mortgage, that Vernor would
conYey the property to Elizabeth .free and clear of all
eneumbranees and that Elizabeth vvould release Josie of
a·n indebtedness ovYing· from Josie to Elizabeth. This
is in fact 'Yhat 'Yas atten1pted by the conveyances recorded on Jannary 28, 29 and 30, 1935, except that Vern or E.
Baird g-ave a mortg-age of $5,000.00 to the firm of Morgan
& Morgan. The .consideration claimed by Josie was that
she, Josie, owed Elizabeth approximately $6,000.00 ('Tr.
76, 77, Ah. 128). The entire evidence of any such agreement between Elizabeth, J o.sie and Vernor was oral.
There vvas not the slightest evidence in 'vri ting or in the
acts of the parties shoV\ring that sueh an agreement wasmade excepting the instruments subsequently recorded.
It is admitted by J. Rulon Morgan that he received n·otice
of sheriff's sale, mailed by the .sheriff on January 2-5,
1935 from Heber City (Tr. 39, 336, Ab. 120, 191). That
he prepared the documents at or subsequent to that time,
ex~cepting· the Power of Attnrney, which he claims was
executed December 1'2, 1934, but which document was not
recorded until January 30, 1935, sub-sequent to the date
of re·cording of all other docume·nts.

Josie Baird Giles
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who is supposed to have signed the POiwer of Attorney
in Decem·ber 19'34 was in California in January 19a5.
It is claimed she exe·cuted the Power of Attorney just
pr.ior to leavci.ng .for California. As to the $6,000.00 consideration, Josie Baird Giles co.nte'nded that she owed
her Mother a promissory note o.f $3,500.00, which was
executed at the time of the ·closing of the James R. Baird
e.sta.te in 1·92'6. That the balance of the $6,000.00 or $6,
500.00 which she owed was on aecount of money given
her by :her Mother (Tr. 76, 77, Ab. 128). The promissory
note was never produced. !She testified that she had an
account book of monies advanced by her Mother (Tr. 96,
Ab. 133). Such aecount bo~ok was never produced a.t
the trial.
In ·considering the evid·ence of this indebtedness we
call attention to a. statement by this Court in the case of

Paxton v·. Paxtoni, 80 Utah 540 at 5\53, 15 P. (2d) 1051,
wherein the following statement i'S made:
"It is quite generally :held that a transfer or
mortgage of property between nea.r relatives
which is calculated to~ prevent a creditor from
realizing on his ~claim against one of such relatives
is subject to rigid ·scrutiny. 27 ·C. J. 495, a~nd cases
there cited. Under the rule, a transfer or mortgage of property made to a near relative in consideration of past-due indebtedness will be sustained if attacked in a ·creditor's suit when, and
only whe·n, it is shown the debt is genuine, that
the purpnse of the ·grantee or mortgagee is honest,
and that he acted in good faith in obtaining his
title or lien. The burden, in such case, is east
upon the grantee or 1nortgagee to show the good
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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faith of the ti·n.nsaet.ion bv ·C1ea.r and satisfa:ctorv
eYidence. Elliott & Co. v. "Johnson, 85 W.Va. 706,
10~ S. E. GS1: \V" oody Y. Tucker, Willingham &
Co., 215 ~~tla. 278, 110 So. ±65; Flint v. Chaloupka,
78 Keb. 594, 111 N. \V. 465, 13 L. R. A. (N. IS.)
309, 126 Am. St. Rep. 639; Jones v. Beers, 118
Ore. 31 I, 2±6 P. '711."

The C'ourt refused to sustain the mo~rtga.ge in that
ease when there \Yas no other erviden·ce, except the statements of the partie·s to the transaction.
We agree 'vith Appellants that a trl:le picture of the
evidence can be secured ·only by reading the transcript. ·
e """ill, however, point out pertinent portions o.f the
testimony material to our argument.

'T

(a)

WAS THERE ANY AGREEMENT TO RELEASE THE MORTGAGE AND CONVEY THE FARM?

The testimony of the Bairds was that in 19·33 an
oral agreen1ent vYas made to rele·ase the $15,000.00 note
in ~consideration of a. conveyance by Vernor to his Mother, Elizabeth, and a release hy Elizabeth of the indebtedness supposedly owing from Josie to her Mother. Written
evidence and acts of the parties ·subsequent to 1933 show
clearly that they all considered that Vernor was still the
owner of the ranch. We call attention to the answer of
Josie Baird Giles in ease No. 1266 ·Civil, filed by the B·ank
Commissioner on August 14, 1934 against J. Harold
Giles and Josie Baird Giles for the foreclosure on the
water stock.

Josie verified her anS"W·er on October 11,
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1'934 and stated 1n paragraph 7 with regard to such
stock:

'''She sold said c.ertificates of \Vater stock and
the water represented thereby to Vernor E. Baird
and ever since said time said Vern or E·. Baird
has been Rnd no·\v is the legal owner o.f the same.

"
When this discrepancy \vas pointed out at the trial
Josie ''s counsel inserted the amendme·nt \vhich now appears in. the Ans\ver and which adds that since 1933 Elizabeth J. Baird has been the equitable owner of said certificates. The an1endment was not made until after the
trial had opened (Tr. 246, Ah. 1·64-). At the time the
origi'llal ansvver \Vas made Morgan & Morgan \Vere advising

l~er

and the ans,ver \Vas prepared and s'\vorn to

subsequent to the time when Mo-rgan & Morg·an supposedly had been asked to prepare deeds foT transfer
of the real estate and water stock to Elizabeth.

See

testin1ony of J. Rulon Morgan (Tr. 343, 344, Ah.

19~3,

194). If an agreen1ent had been made in 1933 to trans-

fer the property to Elizabeth, and if the firm of Morgan
& Morgan had been told to n1ake out the papers con-

sumating this transfer, such a situation- ''ras certainly
not reflected by the vei'ified ans\ver of Josie in the aetion
filed by the Bank of Heber City.

The an1ended cross-

complaint of J. Rulon Morgan as exe-cutor of the Estate
of Eliza·beth J. Baird, deceased, alleges that Vernor E.
Baird began to use the water in 1929 and
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"·continued to use such "·ater for irrigation purposes until the irrigation season of 1935 ". (A b.
56, para. 6).
The eYidence shows that there 'vas no transfer of
the possession of the farm in 1933 and tha.t Joe \IV alker,
who was running the farm for Vernor, continued in possession through the year 1934. ('Testimony of Josie Biaird
Giles ·Smith, Tr. 81, .A.b. 129). In 1935 th·e property was
leased to Josie's then husband, Ray S!mith. This, of
course, ,,-as after the actual transfer of title from Vernor
to Elizabeth and t"~o years after the sup;posed agreement
to convey to the ~!other. Ray Smith could not have
leaHed the property as Josie's husband prior to 1935 as
the Decree of Divorce from Harold did not become final
until January of that year. Josie testified that the agreement with her Mother 'va.s that the property should be
conveyed to her free and clear of indebtedness (Tr. 93,
.Alb. 13'2). When conveyed, instead of being free and clear
of encumbrances it wa.s subject tn a. mortgage for $5,000.00 to the firm of Morgan & Morgan. When asked
about this mortgage Josie first stated that she instructed
Wd.lliam to giYe that mortgage, though she later changed
this testimony and said she didn't know 'vhy it vvas
given ('Tr. 114, 115, Ab. 13.S). Josie claims to have made
the agreement with Verno-r and her Mother in 1933 and
not to have been able to ·close the transaction, making it
necessary to leave a Power of Attorney with William
dated December 12, 1934. Her testimony is that she lived
\vith Vernor fro1n October 1933 until the last of Decem1

ber 1934 (tTr. 129, 130, _._\.b. 141).

It seems that Josie
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was afraid to app-roach Vern or on the closing o.f this
deal though she t~stified that. sh·e was keeping house for
him for $10.00 a month, out of which she had to run the
house ('Tr. 136, 137, A~b. 142). Surely Vernor under
such circumstances and while J-osie was living in the
same .house, could have been approached upon the matter
of executing a deed to Elizabeth if the parties had already agreed upon giving such a deed. Josie testified
that she was waiting to get the $15,000.00 note. The
transfer was made quickly enough without the $15,000.00
note after the notice of sale was received hy the firm of
Morgan & Morg·an. Morgan & Morgan even saw fit to
take a $5,000.00 mortgage to themselves "vithout the surrender of the $15,000.00 note to Josie. Vernor signed
this oblig~ation though he ow·ed Morgan & Morgan
nothing. ('Tr. 371, Ab. 201).
\

Elizabeth Baird died i'TI February of 1938 and Rulon
Morgan was appointed her executor, yet his account as
exeeutor shows no collection of rent from the tenant on
the ranch (Tr. 230, Ab. 160). Mr. Duke, who had been
on the ranch since the de1ath of Eliza:beth Baird had paid
considerable rent after Flebruary 1938 (Tr. 23'2 & 2'33,
Ab. 1-60, 161). Vernor continued the listing of the ranch
as his property and the $15,000.00 note as a liability in
the years 19-33, 19·34 and 193.5 (See Exhibits 14 and 15).
AppelLants make the following statement regarding these
exhihi ts at page 31 of their Brief:
1

'' N:either of these exhihits were filled out
when signed and J. Clyde Mitchell, a. witness,
·called by the Moultons testified that the Wasatch
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Livestock Loan Company knew that Vernor -¢lid .
not claim title to the farm at the time the applieation wa.s made.''
The testimony, we believe, does not support the
statement that Mr. Mitchell kne\V tha.t V·ernor did not
claim title to the farm. It shows that Vernor while he
may have signe·d the applications in blank directed what
should go on the statements and the sta.tem·ents were
filled out accordingly. His testimony is as follows, ('Tr.
380}:

"Q. Well you made· a statement In 1935 didn''t
you Mr. B1aird ~?

''A. Yes.
''Q. And you made that up from your 19'34 statement didn't you~
·
''A. Well I would say part -of it was.

"Q. Part of it was taken from the old statement
and part was new material? Is th-at right~
''A. That is wha.t I would say.

YeB.

''Q. And you told Mr. Mit·chell what to· put In
that was new did you not?
"A. Yes sir."
The penciled notations on Exhilbits 14 and 15 which
are the financial staten1ents, were made by the Wasatch
Livestock Loan to show what was to go in the new statements which were signed in bla:nk (Testimony of Mr.
Mitchell, Tr. 383, A b. 204). Vern or B-aird continued to
instruct the

L~ivestock

Loan to put the farm

!()fi

the state-
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ment until October 26, 193 6, when it was taken off (Testimony of Mr. Mitchell, Tr. 388, Ah. 205).
1

)

Mr. Mitchell stated tha:t, (Tr. 388):
''For s-ome time- we had known for some
tilne -vve weren't going to have the farm."
Mr. Mitchell did not say that Vernor did not claim title
to the £arm. Of course, if it was m-ortgaged for $15,000.00 whi·c.h he was not able to pay it could easily be suppnsed that he would not have the farm very long. I~t was
brought out that t.he budget allowed by the Wasateh Livestock L,oan did not provide ·a;nything for the running of
the farm. This was natural sinee the W asa,t~ch Livestock
Loan was not taking a:ny of the money from the farm
which could be used £or running it or applied on the payment of the mortgage if \!Jernor so desired (Tr. 389-390,
Ab. 204, 205). Vernor was very free at first to deny that
he had given any sta.teme-nts listing this nanch as an
asset CTr. 867, kb. 200).
T;he statement in the aJbstract of record of Mr. Mitchell's testimony t.ha t, (Ah. 205) :
''W·e kne~w that he did not c1aim title to the
farm prior to the time the notation was made, because we made no provision for any payment on
the farm. .
'' ·
-is not borne out by the testimony. There was no reas-on
given as to why no provision was made for p1ayment on
the farm exeept that they were not ta~king the proceeds
from the farm ('Tr. 389, 390).
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At p.ag·e 31 of Appellants' B·rief it is .stated that
Elizabeth paid the :assessment levied upon water s·took
in 1933. The matter of the payment by Elizabeth to the
Lake Cre·ek Irrigation Comp·any will be taken up more
thoroughly hereafter. She did not, however, make· any
paymenl in 1933. Admittedly the records of the Lake
Creek Irrig·a tion Company show that .in 19~34 the Clompany '\Yas given credit on its note to Elizabeth J. Baird
for $132.20, which wa.s the entire balance due on her note.
The total amount required to be p1aid was $157.20. The
difference ·of ·$2·5.00 ,,~as paid by Vernor Baird. ~The records .of th·e Company as read by Judge Hansen at the
trial definitely show this. His statement is as follows,
( Tr. 307, A b. 180, 181) :
''Paid March 13, 1934, amount of check turned
~back to Company to apply on assessment owed by
Josie Baird Giles and V ern·or Baird a's shown
albove. Vernor paid $25. Total $157.20. ''
1

If Vern or ·had no interest in the pr.operty why· W3Js he
paying ~$25.00 in 1'9•34 and why was the assessment owed
by J o.sie Baird ·Giles aind Vern or Baird~
There was another assessment paid hy Elizabeth in
1~37 (Tr. 308, .L~b. 181). This is immateriJal a.s it was
after the 193:5 sale of the ·note and deed to the property.
·Certainly it cannot be claime·d that the partial payment
by Elizabeth in 1934 s'hows ·an equitable transfer of
the property from Vernor to Elizabeth when Vernor was
required to pay $2·5.00 ·of the ass.essment. N·o doubt he
was hard up and that was all he could pay. The Comp1any
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o:wed Eliz.a.beth money and it is certainly within the realm
of possi!bility that Elizabeth w·ould give Vernor a tem.
porary lift.
The follo~wing question and answer were given on
dirHct examination. of Vern or as to the pos'Session of the
ran·ch after the supposed deal in 1933, (Tr. 36-2) :

''Q. Now what was done with respect to the orwn. .
ership and operation of the ranch from that
time on1
''A. Well want on about the same as it had been.''
This statement is ·omitt·ed from the a.bstvact.
On pages 28 .and 32. of App·ellants' Brief there seems
to he .some contention made that Josie had no right to
sue Vern or on· the promiss·ory note for some other reason than the claimed agreement of 19~33~ The r·eas·on for
this, is set forth on P1age 37 of A ppella.nts' Brief where
they state:
'''Moreover, if the ·Trial ·C,o~urt's ·finding with respect to the lien of the Heber City Bank is to be
sustained, Vern or. had a right to rescind the contract of pur·ch.a.se and repudiate the note as to
Jo·sie, and likHwi'se as to the Moultons, who in
any event acquired no greater right than Josie
ha~d at the time of the levy.''
We do· not see upon what theory this -contention is made
unless it is that there was s-ome kind of anticipatory
breach of the duty .of Josie to deliver the stock upon payment ·of the mortgage to her. At no tim·e did the claim
of the Bank exceed the a.mount due on the note from
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Vernor to Josie. Had he paid his note the lien on the
st.ork could ha"\""e been readily discharg-ed. If there is
any merit to Appellants' contention, then every contract
of purchase where the Yendor maintains a mortgage on
the property being purchased "rould be subj·ec.t to cancellation at .once by the buyer. Furthermore Vernor made
no objection to the pledge of the stock to the Bank and
never pretended to refuse payment on that acc:ount. R.
S. U. '33, 104-37-27 is cited by Appellants (Page 29). This
section of the statute deals "~ith sheriff's s~ale. So long
as the mortgage had not been released ·bef.ore the attachment or execution on the note, it has no application.
At pa.ge 33 of their .hrief Appellants mention the fact
that Josie Baird Giles obtained her divorce from J. Harold Giles upon the groood of failure and refusal of the
Defendant to p·rovide Plaintiff with the common necessities of life. The file in that ·case was introduced over
Respondents' objecti~n apparently to show that Josie
was with.out funds. Surely Respondents are not bound
by the findings of the Oo~urt in a case to whrich they were
not a party and whic.h wa;s never ·contested. Her testimony was that he would have paid her if he had had the
money (Tr. 27 5, .A!b. 171).
·Rulon Morgan was ·called as a witness to explain the
reason for taking the $5,000.00 mortgage to Morgan &
Morgan, which mio:rtgage was prior in time to the conveyance to. Elizabeth J. Baird. Rulon Morgan claims
that one of the reasons f.or talcing the mortgage was to
assist Elizabeth J. Baird in the procuring of funds to
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pay off the bank in ease No. 12·66 Civil in case she lost
the suit. It is not only unusual for attorneys to be so
'S•O'licitous of .clients' financial arrange-ments, prior to the
time when the neeessity for financial assistance is necessary, but it also shows .an extreme lack of confidence
in the merits of the defense. It also appears tha:t Vernor
Baird, the signer of the $5,000.00 promissory note, was
in no 'vay obligated to the firm .of Morgan & Morgan
('Tr. 371, A b. 201).
('b)

WAS THERE A $6,000.00 OBLIGATION OWING BY JOSIE
BAIRD GIL:IDS TO ELIZABETH J. BAIRD?

The contention of Appellants is that Josie owed her
Mother approximately $6,000.00. That a portion of this
wa.s a $3,500.00 note given ''when t'he estate was settled"
('Tr. 7~6, 77, Ab. 128). Josie test~fied that she gave this
note because she took s.ome of the most expensive ground
('Tr. 77, A:b. 128) .' William B:aird testified fhat at the
time his Father's E·state was being settled his Mother,
Elizabeth, advanced $3,000.00 ·Or more to the Estate
(Tr. 13S, ~b. 142). He testified that it was necessary to
have the $3,000.00 "to make the division" (Tr. 160,
omi~tted from Afbstr:act). Each of the children were required to ·give a note to .s-ettle this with their Mofher ('Tr.
161, A b. 146).

See also the t.estim.ony o.f Vern or Baird

('Tr. 36·6, Ab. 200). Vernor was very definite that he gave
his

M~other

only one note.

William and Vernor were

teS<tifying with regard to the very money advanced by
Elizabeth 'by reason of vvhich Josie w:as supposed to have
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
g1ven Elizabeth a $3,500.00 promiss.ory note. We submit that from the testin1ony the advance and the notes
given ,,~ere necessarily prior to distribution of the estate.
"\Ye no'v eall attention to the Final Aceount, Report -and
Petition for Distribution in the matter of the Father's
Estate (See 'Plaintiffs' Exhibit 8). On page 6 of the Final
Account it a.ppears that the estate received $3,16·5.00 on
).I arch 4, 1926 fron1 Eliza beth J. Baird. \Villi am Baird
'vas asked as to \Yhether or not ''this \Yas the amount adYaneed to fhe estate". He said, (Tr. 1·63, 164, Ah. 146) :
''I imagine it is. It is three thousand o-r m.ore.
I don't know just exactly.''
It is therefore esta.blish.ed by Appellants.' own witnesses
that the adYance made by Elizah~th was prior to the
division of the property and tha.t the $3,16·5.00 entered
in the account "Tas the money referred to. The account
show·s that this money was paid in full by .cash and the
giving of promissory notes,----the note of Josie heing for
only $153.32, not $3,500.00 (see p:a ge 23 of Exhibit 8).
On that page of the account it appears that Elizabeth
rec.eived $500.00 in cash and promisso-ry notes, which included the note of Vern or E. Baird of $19 21.32, of William H. Baird of $153.32 and of Josie. B:aird of $153.32.
William testified that his note -vvas for one hundred and
some dollars ('Tr. 161, 164, A h. 146). Vernor testified
that he gave only one note and it was for $900.00 ('Tr.
365, 366, .A!b. 200). It the refore appears that there was
an advance of money by Elizabeth but the sett·lement was
made in full without any note by Josie except the one
1
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for $i.53.32. Josie did pay her note .of $15·3.32 (see the
nota.tions on the back of Paintiffs' Exhibit 10 and testimony of Josie, Tr. 291, 2.9·2, Ab. 175).

If Josie received more than her share in real estate
why didn't she give her Mother part of the sheep distributed to her~· She re.eeived 195 head of ewes and 3
hucks. (See . the Decree o.f Distribution at page 25 of
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 2). The she.ep were sold for $4,000.00
(Tr. 130, Ab. 141). Elizabeth herself received 585 ewe
shee-p and 9 bucks (page 23 of Exhiibit 2.). Certainly any
discrepancy in values could have- been adjusted by change
in the distribution of sheep without giving additional
promissory notes. AH of the heirs signed the P·etition
1

for sp.ecific distrilbution of the property of the estate,

in which the following statement is made, (pages 29 and
33 of Exhibit 8):
''We, the undersigned, \vido-vv and children
of James R. Baird, deceased, together with L·. C.
Montgomery, the :Guardian ad-liten1 of Evelyn
Baird a. minor child, respectfully represent as follows, to wit :1. That we have met together, partitioned the
property of said estate as nearly as can be done
by us and to our s:atisfaet~ion, one-third to the
-vvidow and one-ninth to each of six children having an interest in the said estate, the seventh
child, John M. Baird "Tith his ''rife A'liee I. Baird
having assiigned all the right, title, interest, claim
~and demand of the said J·ohn M. Baird of, in and
to the property of said estate to the petitioners
herein, to be distributed to them the same as
though the said John J\1. Baird had no interest.
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The prop~rty partitioned to each of the undersigned by the a~ction of all and suhj ec.t to the· .approval of th[s court to be distributed to them as
all of the remaining' prop.erty of the ~said estate
after paying costs and expenses o.f administration
not already paid and of closing the estate and is
as follows, to wit:-"

How could there, after such careful division of the prop...
erty, be any necessity for further adjustment 1
At page 34 of Appellants' Brief reference is made
to a sale by Mrs. Ba1ird to Josie of a. part of the prop·erty
to which Mrs. B·aird was entitled. We submit there is
no testimony in the record that Mrs.. Ba.ird sold any property to Josie.

We now consider the question of claimed advances
made hy Elizabeth a.fter the closing of the estate. On
cross-e:x;amina tion -of Josie, she was continually asked
for a definite itemization of this. supposed $3,000.00 indebtedness. The only items that could be given by her
were a $100.00 dentist bill, hospital and doctor bill of
$250.00, $25.00 for an apartment and $75.00 in 19 32 when
she moved. IShe was asked, ('Tr. 99, Ah. 134) :·
1

"Is that all you can tell us about this $3,000.00 as to when you received it1"

to which she replied:
"iWell, yes, it is right at the present.''
She said that she had an account of the indebtedness to
her Mother (Tr. 94, 95, Ab. 133). Nothing further was
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ever said at the trial a:bout this account. Surely if any
had existed counsel would not have overlooked it. That
there was no definite obligation by Josie to pay her
Mother whatever monies were advanced was shown by
the following question and answer (Tr. 101, 102, omitted
from A·bstra:ct).

"Q. Isn't it a. fact that that was just an allowance, Mrs. Smith, she gave you beca~se she
had money~
'·'~A.

Well I don't kno-w."

We submit that the testimony with regard to the supposed $3,000.00 indebtedness iby Jo-sie to her Mother on
account of advances is not such as would permit .a. finding of consideratiion for the transfer as requir·ed within
the case of P:amton v. Paxton, a'bove cited.
DID ELIZABETH J. BAIRD PURCHA1SE THE· STOCK CERTIFICATES FROM THE LAKE OREgK IRRIGATION COMPANY?
(See Appellants' Brief, pages 2:5 to 27 and 54).

The evidence does not show that Lake Creek Irrigation Company ever acquired title to the stock. The stock
in question has at all times stood in the name of Josie
Ba~rd Giles (Tr. 315-16, Ab. 184). No notiee of the
assessment or sale wa.s ever given to Josie Baird Giles
('Tr. 303, 304, 317, A b. 178, 184). This was the only sale
ever held by the Company (Tr. 817, Ab. 184). Assuming, however, that the c~ompany had title to the stock,
there .is no recor-d that the ·0 ompa.ny ever sold the stock
1
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to Elizabeth J. Baird. On the contrary the reeords show
that it 'Yas redeen1ed by \,.. ernor. The follo,ving is taken
from· the minutes of the Company as read in evidence by
Judge Hansen (Tr. 307, Ab. 180):
" 'Resolved that the stock s~old for assessInent and bought in by the Lake Creek Irrigation
Company at their meeting of April 1, 1933 has
been redeemed by the following stockholders by
paying all oblig·a tions on the stock.
" 'Therefore, Be It Res·olved that the old
certificates be surrendered and the President and
Seeretary of the Company be authorized to issue
new certificates to release the stnck from the
·Treasury of the Company. T.he following shares
were ihought in by the Company April 8, 1933.'
''There are ten ·names written on -the page and
oppos~ite the names are figures under the word
' shares'. Among those names is Vern or Baird
without the number of shares and a mere ditto
mark, then it continues :
'' 'The Secretary was authorized to p.ay the
amount due Mrs. Baird as soon as the mo·ney is
collected fron1 the delinquent assessments.' ''
Since the stock \Yas redeemed by ''the following stockholders", Vernor Baird was the one who redeemed this
stock.
No minutes appear anywhere in the records showing a sale to Elizabeth B-aird. Mr. Crook, Preside-nt of
the Company, testified that the water stock was never
sold to her ('Tr. 214).
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we particularly request the c·ourt to refer to the
Transcript, and not to the abstra.ct, for this testimony,
be·eause the a.bstract report (pages 156-7) is at variance
with the Transcript on this point. We submit that the
testimony as given fails to show a sale of water stock to
Elizabeth Baird at any time.
At page 213 of the Transcript appears the follow1ng:
'~ Q.

And as these assessments fell due from time
to time you merely took the assessments out
of the money that the -corporation was owing
Mrs. Baird, isn't that it~

'·'·A. No, sir; not always.
'·',Q. Well, I understand but most of the time~
"A. N o, s1r.
.
,., Q. Do you know what part of this time as shown
by these hooks~
''A. I kno·w of one instance, yes, sir.
'·' Q. Is that

all~

' 'A. That is all. ; '
·At page 214 of the Transcript appears the follow1ng:
'·' Q. Do you recall at a time when the company
agreed to s-ell it to Mrs. Elizabeth J. Baird'

''A. Not to Mrs. Elizabeth J. Baird, no sir.''
E.xcept for the

$13~2;20

a.pplied in 1934 on a portion of
1

the cost of redemption by Vern or Baird the money owing
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to Elizabeth by the Lake Creek Irrigation c·ompany was
paid from monies c-ollected on asse-ssments and applied
on her nrote in favor of Hylton (Tr. 302-307, Ab. 177-181).
Appellants state at page :2·6 of their Brief that:
••·The -only reason a new certificate vvas not
issued to Elizabeth J. Baird was because the old
certificates 'Yere not surrendered to the C'Ompany."
'': e submit that the testin1ony has nothing to do with
a transfer to Elizabeth. Her na.me is not me·ntioned in
connection "-ith this testimony ('Tr. 31'2, Ab. 18Q). It is
much more likely that Mr. Crook had in mind a. transfer
of the stock to \Tern or rather than a transfer of the stnck
to Eliza·beth. If the stock had been sold to Elizabeth on
the title of the ComJ>any secured by assessment, it would
not have been necessary to secure the sto-ck certificates
as they would have been cancelled through failure to pay
the assessments. However, for a transfer to Vern or
from Josie the surrender of the certificates would have
been necessary. We submit therefore that Mr. Crook,
the Preside·nt of the Company, could only have been
thinking of a transfer from Josie to Vern or when he said
that the transfer had not been made because ''they
couldn't give us the old certificates''. In any event the
name of Elizabeth J. Baird is not mentioned in ·connection with this statement. It appears to have been common knowledge tha.t Vernor vvas using the 'vater and he
\\·as treated in many respects as the o\vner on the books

of the Company.
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DO THE CIRCU·MSTANCES UNDER WHICH THE NOTE WAS
LEVIED ON PRECLUDE THE MOULTON'S FROM CLAIMING
TITLE TO THE NOTE?
(See pages 3.9 to 44 of Appellants' Brief).

We claim five distinct reasons, each of them adequate in itself, why Geo-rge B. Stanley's possession of
the note in no way pre-clude.s the Moultons from suit
thereon or claiming title thereto:
1. ·The relationship of attorney and client has
never existed between Georg-e B ..Stanley and Josie Baird
Giles.

2. Josie was told ihy
the promissory note.

~1:r.

Stanley to come and get

3. Josie was told long prior to the attachment that
if the Moulton notes were not paid the $15,000.00 note
would he attached.
4. N eit:her Josie nor anyone on her behalf ever
demanded the note until after it '\Ya.s in the hands of the
Sheriff.
5. Josie has waived any objection to the circuinstances of the attachment by failing to raise the ohjeetion in the action wherein the no;te was atta.ched and sold
on execution.
The following fac:ts 'vere ·testified to at the trial,
there being no- dispute as to the major portion of such
testimony. The note and mortgage were prepared in
19:29 by George B. Stanley at the request of Vernor
Baird ('Tr. 397, 410 and 411, Ab. 208, 211). Josie did not
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request the "\Vork done or pay for the same. She did not
testify that she ever had any other conversation "\vith
Stanley except that she demanded the note, she says, in
1933. Mr. Stanley says not until after it wa.s in the hands
of the sheriff (Tr. 398, Ab. 208). The relation of attorney and client therefore did not exist. George ·Stanley
\vas not admitted to practice law until a year and a. half
after the preparation of the note and mortgage (Tr. 410,
Ab. 211). The deed and mortgage \Yere delivered to
·v·ernor Baird (Tr. 410-411, Ab. 211). Vernor Baird
recorded both of these docun1ents (see Plain tiffs' Exhibit 2). Mr. Stanley testified that he wrote letters to
Josie asking her to come and get the note ('Tr. 398, Ab.
208). Josie \Yas very certain that she re-ceived no letters
at all from Mr. Stanley a.t any time {Tr. 107, Ah. 135,
136) though she had corresponded with Mr. Stanley on
the subject as shown by· her letter (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 6)
which when shown to her, she admi~tte·d (Tr. 119, Alb.
138). Mr ..Stanley called on Josie and her hus'hand
Harold in Heber City to get a. settlement on the Moulton
notes (Tr. 399, .LL\_b. 208). He told her on at least three
different occasions that if she didn't pay the Moulton
notes he \Yould attach the $15,000.00 promissory note
('Tr. 400, 412, A b. 208, 211). Mr. Stanley testified that
neither Josie nor anyone else ever demanded the note
until after it had been taken by the Sheriff (Tr. 400, 401,
412, 415, A b. 208, 209, 211, 212). Josie could have had
the note at any time if s'he had asked for it (Tr. 413, Ab.
211). Appellants argue that under the circumstances it
would have been unnatural for Josie not to ha.ve demandSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ed her 'note. If J·osie eX~p·ected 'to ·pay h·er n.otes to the
Moultons, she would not necessarily have been concerned
about her $15,000.00 note remaining with George 'Stanley. w.e may assume that her intentions were honest
a.t the time.

It must not be forgotten that there is no question
in this case as to the delivery of the Vernor B,aird n·ote
to J'osie for the purpose of closing the transaction
wher·ein she sold the· farm and took a purchase money
note and m'ortga.ge. The plaintiffs and defendants both
so allege in their ple1adings. Throughout the trial it was
admitted that Vernor went into possession of the property and made· .a payment thereon. That the transaction
was. -closed so far as Josie was concerned was beyond
question. In the preparration of the note and mortgage
Mr. Stanley received no information whi·ch was not
clearly dis-closed by the public records in the C'ounty
Recorder's Office. The mortgage was recorded N·ovember 12, 1929 (see Plain tiffs' Exhilbi t 2). If J·osie can
avoid p·a.ying what is admittedly an honest debt to the
Moultons 'by leaving the note wit:h Mr. Stanley that is
indeed a. new way to avoid e.reditors. Surely the law
should favor the payment of obligations rather tha.n
avoidance of them.
1

After George S!tanley had inform·ed Josie that he
would attach the Vernor Baird note ·he filed suit on July
7, 1934 and Summons wa.s served on the Defendants on
that da.y. A Demurrer wa's filed on behalf of J·osie Baird
Giles on July 2:8, 1934 and another Demurrer was filed
nn behalf of J. Harold Giles on August 8, 1g.34. Prior
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to the filing of the Demurrers a default had been entered
'Which "~as set aside on motion of the attorney for the
plaintiff. On the ~Oth day of August the Demurrers
'"'ere oYerruled and notiee thereof given to Morgan and
~forgan. Default "~a~ ag·ain entered on O,ctober 1, 1934.
Notice by the Sheriff that the promissory no·te which had
been leYied upon "Tas admittedly mailed and re-ceived by
Morgan and Morgan on January 25, 1935 (see E·xhlbit
12). In all of these proceedings the defendants though
represented by attorneys never raised the question of the
legality of the attachment and levy. We believe that
Josie still thought she would pay her honest obligations.
If she had any objection to the attachment and levy it
should ha.ve been raised in those proceedings and she is
now precluded from any sueh objeetion. See authorities
citea in the next subdivision of this brief. We further
call attention of the Court to the fact that Vernor Baird
in 1938 went to George Stanley for further advice (Tr.
403, Alb. 209). At least that was the contention and certain evidence was excluded on that ground. If Q-eorge
B. Stanley was guilty of failure to deliver the note upon
demand, is it likely that Vernor \vould have further consulted him a.s an attorney at law~ To e-nforce the promissory note will aid the enforcement of an llonest dbligation .such as was intended by the parties. If it is denied,
the payment of a just obligation may be avoided. The
C'ourt knows of its own knowledge that the town of Heber
City is a small country town. There are only two or
three lawyers practicing there. Business transactions
1

are prett)'T well known to everyone. GHnrge Stanley knew
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no more 'vith regard to this transaction by reason of his
having prepared the instruments than he would have
otherwise known. As an abstracter the whole matter
necessarily ~came to his attention from the public records.
The Trial Court found that the relationship of attorney
and client never existed between Mr. •S!tanley and Josie.
We do not see how any other finding could he made when
there is no testimony that J·nsie ever went to Mr. 8tanley's office except for the purpose of signing a deed.
We call attention again to the fact that she never testified to any c-onversation ever had with Mr. Stanley regarding the making of these papers. She never employed
him or paid him any money. If the ·CJontention of the
appellants is correct that the knowledge acquired by Mr.
Stanley in the preparation of this 11 ote eould not be used,
then the levy vvould have been just as invalid if the note
had been in the possession of Josie herself o~r any other
party, since it -could still be contended that Mr. Stanley
first learned of the note by reason of his having prepared it. The atta:ck upon the atta:cbnient in these proceedings is collateral. Unless the attachment is void,
the matter may not be raised here. See autho-rities cited
in the next subdivision of this hrief.
IS PLAINTIFF'S TITLID TO THE PROMISSORY NOTE AFFECTED
BY THE CLAIMED DEFECTS IN THE AFFIDAVIT FOR WRIT
OF ATTA!GHMENT?
(See pages 44 to 48 of Appellants' Brief).

The evidence shows t'ha t the writ of a ttachn1ent
was issued July 7, 1'934 (plaintiffs' exhibit 1) and that
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the sheriff took the note into his possession on that date
(Tr. 8, Ab. 114). ·The \Yrit of attachment was served
on the defendants on July 7, 1934. Default wa.s thereafter entered and \Yas set aside on motion of plaintiffs'
attorney. Demurrers were filed by the defendants which
were overrued. Judgment was subsequently taken. The
writ ·of execution was issued D·ec. 19, 19,34 while the
sheriff still had possession of the note. There is no
question in this cas·e as to intervening rights between the
date of the attachment and the date of writ of execution.
The transfers appearing in the a;bstract were not dated
until Jan. 26, 1935, and thereafter. The most that can
be elaimed for a. defective attachment is that the date of
priority changes to Dec. 19, 19i34 instead of July 7, 1934,
which in no way affects the rights of the parties. However, we believe that under the ple·adings there is no
question before the C'ourt as to the validity of the writ
of attachment.

The plaintiffs allege in their complaint,

paragraph 7, (Ab. 31):
"that .on said 7th day ·of July, 1934, :said note and
mortgage were attached by the sheriff of Wasatch
County under and by virtue of a writ of attachn1en t issued in said action.''
The answer of Vern or E. Baird and Mary A. Baird,
which v1as adopted by the other defendants, recites in
paragraph 2 (Ab. 40):
''these answering defendants admit that the
sheriff of Wasatch County attached the note and
mortgage mentioned in plaintiffs' complaint in
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the manner and under the circumstanees hereinafter all·eged and not otherwise. ' '
The circumstances thereafter alleged are the circumstances as to the. poss·ession of the note by George B.
·Stanley. It appears, therefore, that the attachment is
admitted by the pleadings, except so far a.s it is affe-cted
by the possession of Mr. Stanley. The defendants having admitted the attachm·ent c.annot he heard to.complain
of any irregularity. The defendants further waived any
such irregularity by their appearance in the suit. The
following :statement is made 1n 4 Am. Jur., pa:ge 932,

Sec. 617:
'·'It is generally held that if a defendant in
an attachment proceeding wishes to take advantage of any defect or irregularity in the proceeding, he must do so by motion or plea before answering to th·e merits, and that if he makes a
gener,al appearance or answers to the merits hefore sudh motion or plea, the defect or irregularity
will he waived. ''
S·ee also S'Bc. 616 on the sa1ne page, and Sec. 649 at page
940; 6 C. ,I. 433, S~c. ;1004;' 6 C. J. 441 as to attack ·Oin.
atta-ehm·ent af·ter judgment.
The question of the r·egula:ri ty of the attachment
cannot 'be raised in a collateral proeeeding but must he
by direct attack.

The following is a

sta·tem~ent

to that

effect in 5 Am. Jur. p1age 174, Sec. 957:
''The record and judgment in the main actio·n
1n an attachm·ent or garnishment proceeding is
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to the extent that other judieial records
and judgment8 are conclusive. Suc.b a judgment
is not open t.o collateral attack unless it is vnid
for lark of jurisdiction in the court rendering it,
or 'Yas fraudulently secured. D·ef€1c.ts and irregularities in the attachment suit are not opeU1
to inquiry in a collateral suit unless they were of
such character as to Yoid the attachment or
garnisihment and deprive the c.ourt of jurisdiction
in the proceedings. ''
T.ha.t the defect in the affidavit does not make the
attaehment void see A-n'tfl.otation in 72 A. L. R. 120 at page
122. The same is true of a defective bond. See the same
Annotation, pag-e 1'25.
IS THE EXECUTION FATALLY DEFECTIVE?
(See Appellants' Brief, page 48).

Appellants complain of the fact that the writ of
execution did not require the Sheriff to satisfy. th:e
judgment out of the property attached as required by
Section 104-37-2, Subdivision {3), !f,. S. U. 1933. The
Sheriff had possession of the prtomissory note at the
time the execution was issued. The defendants had been
~served with ·summons, had appeared in th·e action, and
judgment had been rendered against them. The attachment proceedings were not necessary to give the C'ourt
jurisdiction, as the Court had -personal jurisdiction of
the Defendants. The failure of the writ of execution to
re·quire the officer to sa ti,sfy the same out of the a ttaehed
property could do no more than give a date of priority
as of the ·date of the writ of execution, which was
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December 19th instead ~of July 7th. No party has been
prejudieed by the failure of the writ to include the
recital. The property attached was in fact retained in
the possession of the Sheriff and sold on execution.
Everything was done exactly as it would have be·en done
had the writ of execution complied with subdivision (3)
of Sec. 104-37-2, R. S. U. 1933. The defect, under the
circumstance.s, is at most an irregularity which may
not be attac~ed .collaterally and has been waived by
failure to raise the question in the prior case. See 23
·C. J. 693, Section 691 and authorities cited in portion
of this Brief on the attachment question.
Appellants cite the New York eases of Gilman v.
Tucker, .59 N. Y. !Super., 570, 13 N. Y. 1S. 804, and Place
v. Riley, 98 N. Y. 1, to the effect that the failure •of the
Writ of Execution to require the satisfaction of a
judginent .out of the attached property makes the Writ
of Execution void.

The

~section

of the statute involved

in that case is 645 ·of the New York Civil Practice Act
formerly Se-ction 1370 of the Code of Civil Procedure
and is as follows :
'' vVhere a warrant of attachn1ent issued in
the action has been levied by the sheriff, the
execution n1ust substantially require the sheriff
to satisfy the judgment, as follows :
1. Where the judgment-debtor is a nonresident, or a f•oreign corporation, and the sumInons was served upon his or it, without the state,
or otherwise than personally, pursuant to an
-order ,obtained- for that purpose, and t'he judgment-debtor has not appear·ed in the action; ·out
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of the personal property attae.hed, and, if that is
insufficient, out of the real property attached.
:?. In any other case, ·Out of the personal
property attarhed: and, if that is insufficient, out
of the perS'oual prop·erty of the judg1nent-debtor;
if both are insufficient out ~of the real property
attached; and, if that is insufficient, out of the
real propert3~ belonging to him at the tilne when
the judgment 'Yas docketed in the clerk's office
of the county or at any time thereafter.''

New York also has a section regarding exeeution
against property generally "Then no attachment has.
been issued. That section is 643 of Civil Practice Act
and is as follo,\"~s :
''An execution against property, if the judgment-roll is not filed in the clerk's office of the
eounty to \vhich it is issued, 1nust specify the
time "Then the judgn1ent was docketed in that
county. Except in a case where special provision
is otherwise made by law, it must substantially
require the sheriff to satisfy the judgment out of
the personal property of the judgment-debtor;
and~ if sufficient personal property cannot be
found, out of the real property belonging to him
at the tin1e when the judgment vvras docketed in
the elerk's office of the county or at any time
thereafter. ''
In the case of Place v. Riley the action had been
·Commence.d against a non-resident by attachment.

The

case might be distinguished on the ground that the case
had been comn1enced by attachn1ent rather than by personal ·service.

However, the obj·ection to the Writ of

Execution w·as the failure to provide for the sale of
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unattached personal property before the sale of attached
real property. The Court ~said:
''It commanded the sheriff to collect the judgment out of the attached p·ersonal property of the
judgment-debtor, and if that was insufficient, out
.of his attached real property, whereas the case
was one under the seeo-nd subdivision of Section
1370, by which the execution must go, first against
the attached personal property, ,second against
the other personal property of the judgment
debtor, and lastly against the attached real prop·erty. ''
The Court made the further statement:
"The statute is peremptory that executions
in the cases specified 'must require' the sheriff
to satisfy the judgment in the way pointed ~out.
The evident intention· of the second subdivision
of the s-ection was to prevent res-ort to the real
·estate of an absconding or c~oncealed debtor, for
the satisfaction of a judgment obtained in an
action in which an attachment had been issued
and levied upon his real estate, until after the
remedy against his personal property, both attached and unattached, had been exhausted. This
is in accordance with the general policy of the
law, rounded upon reasons less forcible perhaps
no'v than formerly, but which it is nevertheless
within the discretion of the legislature to maintain.''
We see that the objection of the Court was not the
failure to require the Sheriff to sell the property attached but the failure to require the sale of unattached
pers.onal prnperty prior to the ,sale of real property.
·The Court also emphasizes the fact that the statute uses
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the word "must". The Utah statute says ''shall''. That
the New York Court does not consider a general execution void for failure to require the sale of attached
property is show·n in the case •of Thomas v. Bogert,
reported in 33 Hun. 11. In that case an attachment
had been issued and after judgment a general execution
'vas issued in which no mention of the a;tt.achment was
made. After the sale the attorney for the Plaintiff
attempted to countermand the first execution and hold a
new sale. The present action was brought to redeem the
property from the first sale, which the C;ourt held binding and could not be countermanded by the Plaintiff's
attorney. The question before the Court is stated in the
following language :
''It is insisted, however, that the plaintiffs
are not entitled to judgment, because the first
execution, under which the sale was made and
of "\vhich the redemption is predicate, was invalid,
for the reason that the execution was a general
one and was unauthorized hy the statute.''
That the general execution which failed to refer to
the attachment was not void is made .clear by the following statement by the Oourt:
"It thus appears that the sale which took
place under the first execution was binding upon
the plaintiff, the defendant in the executi~on not
having interposed any objection, and that the
plaintiffs' testator being the grantee of the judgment debtor, took the proper steps to redeem."
The case of Gilman v. Tucker which was decided by
the Superior Court of N·ew York City followed the case
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of Place v'. Riley without regard to the reason given
for the ~decision. Being decided by a court inferior to
the ·courts deciding the other two New Y,ork cases, it
cannot he the law of New York.
It is interesting to note that the annotator of Gilberts' Civil Practice (N. Y.) Volume 1, 19'22, cites the
ca,se of ·Thomas v. Bogert as being the present law on the
question of whether or not a general execution is void
if it fails to mention the attachment, rather than the
New York City cas·e of Gilman v. Tucker. (See Annotation to sec. 645) .
The case of Swift v. Agnes, 33 Wis. 228, makes the
following statement in regard to a statute which provides for a general. execution and a special execution
when property is attached:
''·Constru~ng

these statutes together (and
certainly they are in pari materia and should be
so construed)' we are of the opinion that it is
optional wi tb the judgrnen t creditor, in an action
wherein the property of his debtor has been attached, to issue a special or limited execution,
merely directing that the attacihed property he
sold, or to issue an execution in the ordinary
form, with the addition thereto of a special direction for the sale of the attached property.''
In Miss,ouri it ·has .been ~held that a failure to comply
with a statute does not make the execution void. However, the Mis-souri law is the reverse of the U tab

la~w

in

that where personal .service is had on the defendant and
a general judgment

i~s

entered, the statute says that the
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execution must be against all the property of the defendant \Yhether it is attached or not. The reason for the
rule appears t.o be that the defendant may be p·ermitted
to surrender other property for the purpose of g.atisfying the judgment. There miglht also he thir·d parties
interested in claims against the property attached so
as to make it advisable to sell other prop·erty. In the
cases of Krit.zer v. Sm.ith, 21 Miss.ouri 296, and Wamsley
v. Snotc, 53 S. W. (2d) 258, it was held that a failure to
comply \Yith the statute did not render the execution void.
That the form of the writ is not grounds for collateral
attack, see 21 Am. Jur. 259, Sec. 521.
We submit that the failure to comply with subdivision (3) of 'Section 104-37-2 is a~t most an irregularity
which is not subject to collateral attack. Also tha·t it
would be proper to conrstrue the subdivision to apply 10nly
to actions where no personal judgment has been taken.
That in cases where a. p·erson·al judgment is taken the
matter should be optional with the plaintiff. We call
attention to Sec. 88-2-2, R. S. U. 1933, which pr·ovides:
,., The rule of the common lav; that statutes
in derogation thereof are to be strictly cons·trued
has no application~ to the statutes of this state.
The statutes establis'h the laws of this state respecting the subjects to which they relate, and
their proV'isi.ons atJtt-d all proceedings under them
are to be liberally co'Jib.Strued with a vietv to eft ect
the ob,jects of the statutes and to promote ju-st~ce.
Whenever there is any variance bet'\veen the rules
of equity and the rules of common la.\v in refere,nee
to the same matter the rules of equity shall
prevail.''
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WAS THERE A. PROPER NOTICE OF SALE?
(18-ee pages 49 to 53 o·f Ap.pellants' Brief).

It is contended by the Appellants tha.t because the
Notice of Sale- stated that the sale would be held on the
28th and the Return shows a sale .of the property on the
29th, there i's no proper noti,ce. We believe that there
is a complete answer to this objection in that t'he s~ale
is not subject to collateral attack because of a defective
notice. The following statement is taken from 21 Am.
Jur. 258, Sec. 519:
''' The general rule is that if there is .any
·ground for relief against an execution, such relief must be sought in the ·Qiriginal ~ause and not
by a new and independent proceedim:g.''
T.hat a judicial sale is not subject to collateral a:ttack becausH of a, defective notice see Annot(l)tion in 1 A. L. R.
at Page 1440. The portion of this annotation a.t Page
1441 dealing with .the time of s·ale has to. do with tbe time
of s·ale required in the statute .and not to the time stated
in the notice.
We believe that ·this is a complete answer to a ppellant 's obje·ction. However the plaintiffs in C~ase No. 1410
Civil assumed the burden of bringing out the facts with
respe-ct to the Sheriff's Sale and p·roved a po,stponement
from January 28th to the- 29th. Such proof was unne·c-essa.ry. This is s-o not only for the reason that the notice
of sale may not be attacked in a collate·ral proceeding,
but the She-riff's R~etu·rn, so fa.r as its recitals go, is conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

41
elusive in a. collateral proceeding. The Sheri:ff''S Return
is a.s follows, (see Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1) :
''I hereby certify that under and by virtue
of the 'vithin and hereto annexed vvrit of execution
by me received ·On the 19th day of December, 1934,
I did on the 21st da.y of January, 19a5, levy on
the property hereinafter described and noticed
the same for sale as the law directs, and on the
29th day of J a.nuary, 1935, at 9 :30 o'clock A. M.
·of said day a.t the front door of t1l·e County C:ourt
House in Heber City, Wasatch c·ounty, Utah, the
time and place fixed for said s:ale, I did attend
and offer for sale at public auction for lawful
money of the United States, the property described as follows:'' (Here follows a description
of the property):
''and sold the whole of the sa.me to A. C. Moulton
:a;nd E. Dewey MDulton the within named plaintiffs, for the sum .o.f $100.00, ,said purchasers being
the highest and only bidders and said sum being
the highest and only bid made, and I have given
said purchase-rs a certificate of sale, and I here-·
with return s·aid writ partly satisfied: to-wit, in
the sum of $100.00. ''
See Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1.
There is nothing irregular appearing on the face of
the return.
The following is a statement of the rule in 21 Am.
Jur. 247, Sec. 496:
"As a. general rule a sheriff's return of exe·cutio'n sufficient on its face is regarded as conclusive, so that it may not be contradicted in collateral proceedings for the purpose of invalida.tSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ing the officer's acts or defeating rights acquired
under them by averments to the contrary or by
parol ·evidence in prnof of such averments, before
the return is vacated by due course of la vv. ''
See also, Jon1es on Evidence, Vol. 4, Sec. 1907 (2nd Ed.)
We believe that the plaintiffs proved a sufficient
title to the promiss-ory note by introducing in evidence
the S heriff's Return.
1

A·ssuming, however, that the appellants could properly atfack the notice of ·sale or ·Sheriff's Return in thi·s
proceeding, the evidence introduced by the Plaintiffs
cured any defect or irregularity. We call attention of
the Court to Section 19-19-12 which provides:
"The Retur;n of the Sheriff upon process or
notice is prima facie evidence of the fa:cts in sueh
return stated. ''
We believe· this section has to do with proceedings in
whidh there is a direct attack and does no.t by iillferenc.e
permit a collate·r.al attack. Assuming further that the
Appellants have destroyed the prin1a fa:cie .case of regularity of the sale by .showing a notiee of sale to he held
on January 28th, the defe·ct w:as properly cured by plaintiffs' evidenee. The sheriff testified as to the facts with
regard to t~he postpone1nent of sale (Tr. 12, 18, Ab. 115,
116). We quo te fron1 the case of Huish v·. Fenkel, 85
.Utah 253, 39 Pa.c. (2d) 330, at page 263 of the Utah
Report, cited by Appella;n ts :
1

"·But \vhen the statute does not 1nake the officer's return conclusive or the only evidence of
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the manner of executing prO'eess, there seen1s to
be no reason why the facts may not be s'hown by
other competent evidenre provided it is not attempted to contradict the return.''
The sheriff's testimony offered by the plaintiffs in
no 'Yay im·peaches his o'Yn return or contradicts the
same. He n1erel~~ sho,Ys an additional fact n.ot appearing in the return that he gave notice that t:he sale would
be held on January 28th at ten o'-clock and that he p-ostponed the _same to January 29th at 9 :30 o'clock A. M.
t~ce

The rule is clearly stated in 3 Banoroft Code Pracood Remedies, page 2656, as follows:
''The return of the sheriff of his official acts
under an execution is presumptively true. F:acts
o1nitted from the return may be supplied by parol
evidence not inconsistent therewith.''

Citing Brusie v. Gates, 80 Cal. 462, 22 Pa.c. 284; Davis v.
Baker, 72 Cal. 494, 14 Pac. 102; Ritter v. 800/n!Ytell, 11
Cal. 238, 70 Am. D·ec. 775.
We call attention to the further fact that the S1l·eriff
te·stified that the sale wa.s postponed at the request of
J. Rulon niorgan, one of the attor.neys of record for the
defendants, a.nd the court so found (Tr. 12, Ab. 115, 85).
The Sheriff might also be allozyed to contradict a return
vvhere he is out of office so that an amended return could
not be made by 1lim. That the 'Sheriff at the time of the •
trial was out of office see Tr. 35.
·Our position is: ·Tha.t the Sheriff's Returrn is regular
on its face and n1ay not be collaterally attacked. That the
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failure to give proper notice -of sale may not be collaterally a1ttacked. That assuming an attack may he made in
this proceeding it is prop·er to permit the Sheriff to· add
addi tionaI fa~c.ts by oral testim-ony showing that the sale
was postponed. That the postponement having been
made at the request of J. Rulon M,organ, the attorney for
the defendant in that case, they may not be hea.rd to
object. That since the Sheriff's term ·of office has
terminated the real facts may be shown by oral testimony
without an amendment of the Return, even though suc.h
testimony might contradict the Return already filed. It
is, of course, clear that there is no contradiction in this
case.
IS THE TITLE OF THE PROMISSORY NOTE AFFECTED BY THE
AMOUNT OF TH·E CONSIDERATION BID AT THE SALE?

(See pages 53 and 54 o.f Appellant·s' Brief).

N·o authority is cited by appellants that mere inadequacy of the amount bid inval1da.tes a. sale. The Utah
case of National Realty Bailes Co. v. Ewing, 55 Ut. 438,
186 P;ac. 1103, holds contrary to appellants' contention.
The teS"fimony of A. C. M·oulton was that he told Mr.
!Stanley to start the bid at $100.00 (Tr. 39!5, .Ah. 207).
Unless necessity required, who would have hid more for
this note under t~1. e circumstances? There had been a
release of the mo.rtgage filed of re·cord the day previous.
• There was a new mortgage of $5,000.00 to M:orga.n &
Morgan and eonveyance of the property recorded
on the same day but prior to the sale. Josie,
or her attorney in fact, by instruments prepared by her
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attorney, had done everything· possible to throw doubt
on the validity of the note. An extensive law suit has
resulted therefron1. The note may hecome valueless if
appellants' eontentions are sustaiined on this appeal. If
the full amount of the judgment had ·been paid the judgment would ha.Ye been satisfied and upon the determination of the invalidity of the note the plaintiffs' judgment

On· the other hand, the plaintiffs

would ha.Ye been lost.

have offered to do equity. The following statement wa.s
made in -open court on behalf of plaintiffs' prior to the

trial, ( Tr. 4, 5) :

''MR. CANNON: I would like to state that
the obligation out of which this transa~ction has
arisen is an oibliga tion of J,osie Baird ·Giles and J.
Harold Giles in the form of promiss·ory notes to
the plaintiffs in this case: That we took judgment
on those promissory notes. And I w.ould like to
state that if we could be paid the amount of the
judgment, we don't care to insist upon any further payments, if we '\vould receive our money
under the judgment, plus interest.
,,, THE OOiURT :
dollars.

Five thousand s.ome odd

''MR. C·AN NON: Tha.t is the principal. And
we would not insist upon deficiency judgments on
the fifteen thousand dollar ·note that we have attached, if we can be permitted to foreclose the
mortgage upon the farm. So that we are n.nt in
this case trying to reap more than the am.ount
.of our original judgment, if we can secure that
amount.
1

'·' JUD·GE HAN·S·EN: ·That is, of <;ourse not
in your pleadings. Y·ou are seeking the am.~unt
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of your judgment and $750 attorneys' fees and
costs.
''MR. C·.ANN·.QN: That is correct. But we
at this time .offer, upon the payment of the original judgment', to release Josie Baird and J. Harold Gile~s from the deficiency which we now have
against them, and also Vern or Baird a~nd his. wife
on the fifteen thousand dollar note. We are not
seeking to reap anything additional t'han that
~amount.''

The decree ]n the ease now before this court does
not provide for any deficiency judgment against Vernor
E. Baird, the signer of the $15,000.00 note. The amount
of the judgment taken is not $15,000.00, but merely the
amount of the judgment in the action by A. C. Moulton
and E. De-wey M·oulton against Josie Baird Giles and J.
Harold Giles plus interest and eosts. There is not even
any attorneys fees added for the foreclosure of the mortgage herein sued upon.
LS THERE A VALID HOMIDSTEAD CLAIM?
(See pages 55 to 67 of Ap·pellants' Brief).

Just what position Appellants wish to take in regard
to the claim of homestead is not clear. They are apparently taking three different positions which are more
or less inconsistent. In ·c:a.se No. 1'2·6!6 a claim was filed
to a homestead in the water stoek alone by Josie B!a;ird
Giles Smith and the Executor of Elizabeth J. Baird's
Estate. In case N·o. 1410 the claim is made to a homestead right in the promissory .note apparently for the
!benefit of Josie. A further elaim is made to a homestead
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right in the real estate .on behalf of the E·xecutor of the
Estate of Elizabeth J. Baird (!See petition in c:ase No.
1266 at Pa,ges 22~24 of the abstract and in paragraphs
6 and 7 of the petition in case No. 1410 a~t page 72 of the
a.bstract). Appellants are not merely trying to straddle
the fence, but in this instanc.e th~e homestead right is
being shifted to three different pieces of property,-the
water stock, the n.ote and the real prop,erty. It must
necessarily be Josie's homestead right that forms the
basis for all three of these claims.
We think that clearly there is no right of homestead
in the certificates of water stock as claimed in case No.
1266. The statute quoted by Appellants SeC'tion 38-0-4,
R. S. U. 1933, provides that the water .st.o~ck,
"shall be exempt from execution to the extent
that such rights a.nd interest are necess·arily employed in supplying water to the homestead for
domestic and irrigating purposes.''
Josie conveyed the property, on which· this water stock
has been used, to Vern or Baird in 19'29. She has never
since had title to the same and it therefore could not be
her homestead. Since she has had no real estate since
1929 she ·Cannot claim she has used water on it since that
time. Her ·claim in case No. 12~66 is further answered by
the fact that she consented to the pledge of the water stock
to the bank. ·The Trial~C~ourt .so found. We rely upon the
argument on that phase o.f the case hereafter set forth,
'
to s:how
that she consented to the pledge of the stock. We·
further call attention to the fact that the Petition :flo·r
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homesite~ad in case

No. 1266 does not ·state th·at J.osie was a
resident of Utah, eX!cept at the time the certificate of stock
was delivered to the Ba.nk of Heber Oity. The evidence
shows tha:t the stock was de·livered to, the Bank in 1929
('Tr. 179, Ab .. 150). Under the petition in that case there
is therefore insufficient showing as to residence to eu~
title Josie to a homestead.
materi~al

facts with regard to the claim of home~stead
ease No. 1410 are important, and w,e thereffo,re
make the following statement in rega.rd thereto: Josie
sold and c.onveyed the only real estate which :she then or
ha,s since owned in the ,state of U ta:h to her brother,
Vern or E. Baird, ·O'ctober 10, 19,29· and took a promissory
note in the su~m ·Of $15,000.00 in payment therefor. It is so
pleaded by the plaintiff and expressly admitted iby the
defendant. It is admitted throughout the testimony that
Vernor Baird went into possessi~on of the prop;erty and
remained in p'a:ssession for several years. The title· never
revested in Jlosie. Afte-r the a:tta·chment and levy of
execution on the promissory note Vern or exe:cuted a deed
to Elizabeth J. B:aird. Prior to the execution of such
deed a $5,000.00 real estate mortgage was given to Morgan & Morgan. The mortgage which se·cures the promis-·The

in

sory note held by the Plaintiff has priority over the conveyaalce hy Vern or to Eliza1heth.

Under these facts we

can see no pos.sible reason why Elizabeth J. Baird or
the Exeeutor of her estate has any possible .claim

t10r

a

homestead based upon the purchase of the property from
Josie Baird Giles. .
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While it appears th~at the pleading filed probably
claims a. hom~stead in the real estate rather than in the
promissory note, 've will nevertheless discuss the question .of a homestead claim in the note as the proc.eed·s of
the sale of the homestead. It is said at page 62 of Appella;nts' Brief that in contemplation of law, Vernor
never ·parted 'Yith the note, in which event it would be
idle to say that J-osie had r.eceived the proceeds of the
sale of the farm. When it is admitted by pleadings as
well as eviden·ce that the n·ote was ''executed and delivered'' it cannot be said that in contemplation of law
she did inot receive the note. The evidence shows and
the court found that Mr. Stanley never refused to deliver
the note to J-osie and that she never demanded it from
him prior to. the time the Sheriff took it into his P·OS·session. Supposing Vernor Baird when he took the mort-.
gage and had it recorded had als-o taken the promissory
note and delivered it to a B·ank where Josie could get it
a.s s·lie wished 1 Wio.uld this Court hold that she had
never received the note~ The note was at all times enforcible ag~nst Vernor. The parties so recognized in
their own testimony when they claimed to have had an
understandi,ng in 1.933 that the promissory note W·ould be
released. Under our sta.tute the note is exempt £or only
one year from the date of sale.
Assuming for the purpose of argument that Mr.
Stauley did refuse to deliver the note to Josie, this c-ould
not alter the situation.

She had legal title to. the note

and was eintitled to enfor·ce its payment. If Mr. Stanley
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had been guilty of conversion of the note it -could in no
way unravel the completed transaction of the sale of the
pr,o:perty and payment therefor. Josie's remedy in the
event of wrongful withholding of the note would be
against him and not a. claim against Vernor.
'The homestead ·claim is further defeated for the reason that no claim of homestead was made at .or prior to
the time of the sale. Josie had notice of the sale as the
Writ of Attachment was Herved on her on July 7, 1934,
more than six months prior tor the date o.f sale. ( See the
!Sheriff's Retur;n in Pilaintiffs' Exhilbit. 1). She thereafter. filed a Demurrer in the a:ction and her a tt.orney received a not~ce of the sale on January 26, 19e:5 (Tr. 39,
A b. 1'20). Her attorney testified that he wa;s in the
Courthouse on January 28, 19'35, apparently to attend
the sale ('Tr. 40, A b. 120). He re:corded numer;ous documents which showed a very clear knowledge a.s to what
was going on. No claim of homestead has been made by
any party until nearly .five years after the Sheriff's sale.
Liberal as this Court has been, no ca,se yet has held that
a homestead may be claimed after Sheriff's sa1e and the
complete vesting of title in the purchas·er. We suggest
t'he follio,wing illustration to show the evil ·of any rule
which would pernrit the claim of homestead after completed sale.
1

Supp.osing ''X;'' owes a. $1,000.00 note and that he
is a wealthy man owning $100,000.00 worth of real property in several pa.r·cels. The owner of the note sues ''X'',
rec;o,vers judgment and levies upon one of the numerous
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tracts of land O\vned by ., X". A sale is held, the property purchased by the ~holder of the note, or a third partr
a~nd the judgment is satisfied. After the sale is completed
"X'' then says: \' N" o, I an1 the head of a fa1nily, I am
entitled to a homestead exemption. I make my claim of
hon1estead ·On the property \vhich you haYe sold. The
sale is void and I am entitled to recover in an action of
ejectment.'' The rule as to \vhen a claim of homestead
shall be made cannot be different vvhether the debtor
owns one or a hundred pieces of pr·operty. No one knows
at the time of the sale \vhat the defendant 1nay own. In
pressing this argument as to the failure to make a. claim
of homestead we do not, of course, admit tha.t a homestead could have been claimed in this c.a.se at the time of
the ·sale. The claim of homestead, however, come's at a
time when Josie has long since removed from the State
of Utah and has been a resident in the State of California
for several years. The stitpulation of facts wit'h regard
to the homestead admits that she was a resident of Utah
only until 19'3-5 (A:b. 77). None of the ca!ses cited by
Appellants go so far a.s to allow a homestead under the
fa.cts before the Court. .
·The case of Utah B-uilders' Sup·ply Comp·any v.

Ga1'"dn.er, 86 Utah 250, 39 Pac. (2d) 327, Petition for
Rehearing, 86 Utah 257, 42 P·ac. (2,d) 989, indicates
that a claim must be made at least prior to the .Sheriff's
sale. In the case of Payson Exchange Savings Bank v.

Tietjen, 63 Utah 321, 225 P-ac. 598, the Court does make
a statement that the sale of home·stead is absolutely void.
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However, there Wail~ a claim of homestead ma.de in that
case prior to sale and therefore the .statement of the
Cour~ goes no further than the case presented .

As to the amount of the homestead in the event it
·is allowed, ·Appellants claim the amount s'hall be calculated as if there were a husband, wife and minor child.
The date of the interlocutory deeree of divor.ce in the
suit by J1o,sie against her hushand was July 1;6, 19·34. The
decree therefore,. became final January 16, 19'35 and sale
of the note took place. January 2'9, 1g.35. S.ee Sheriff's
Return in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1. Appellants are therefore in error when t'hey state at page 59 of their B~rief
that they were husband and 1vife at the time the note
was sold under exe'cution sale. If a homestead is allowed
it can be for only the .$2,000.00 £or the head of the family
,a.nd $300.00 for the child, but we most earnestly urge
that a homestead, in any amount, is not allowable in this
case.
Having answered all of the contentions of the Appellants affecting the rights of the plaintiffs in Case 1410
Civil, we respectfully submit that the de-cision of the
Trial C1nurt should be affirmed.
ARGU·MENT REGARDING LIEN OF THE· BANK OF HEBER CITY
AND ITS SU,C.CESSORS.
(:See pages 13 to 2·5 of Appellants' Brief).

As heretofore pointed out, the ruling of the Court
in favor of the Bank of Heber City giving it a first lien
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terested parties in the action. A. C. Moulton and E.
De,vey Moulton, howey·er, have not appealed from that
ruli.ng-. The Bank had filed a suit on the note of J.
Harold Giles in \Yhich Ans"\\.,.ers "-.:ere filed by Josie and
Harold. This was case No. 1266. Practically the same
issues were raised by a cross-complaint in the suit on
the $15,000.00 note, this being- ca.se No. 1410. The main
issue on this phase of the case, was whether Josie authorized the pledge to the banlr.
It is our contention that complete authority in
Harold to deal with the property of Josie, in the manner
in which he did deal with it, is shown by the circum-

stances under which they conducted their business.
Examination of the testimony will show the property and business status existing between Josie Baird
Giles and J. Harold Giles, her ~usband.

In 19'26 Josie

inherited both real and personal property from her
father's estate (Tr. 264, .A:b. 169).
William H. Baird, Josie's brother, testifying on her
behalf, said:
''Josie got around $3,000.00 more than her share.
She got some sheep. Josie got s~ome s.heep hecause they 'vere building up a business. Josie and
her husband were trying to get a start in the
sheep business, and so they received some sheep
instead of mother. They had the range lands and
wanted to go in the sheep business. They went
into the ~sheep business for a short time and then
the business ble·w up.'' (Ab. 143)
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Josie and Harold were married in 19'24 and were divorced
in 1 9:34. Concerning their relations during marriage,
Josie testified:
1

' ' During that time I did nort know very much
about my husband's business. He had tw·o different businesses. He had the sheep first and
then the ranch. He had the sheep when I inherited them from my father. ·That was in 1926
when the e~sta.te was divided. He managed the
sheep. I do not know what he was doing with
the sheep or know anything ahout the money he
wa.s getting. At that time, he was providing for
me. I think .he had a checking acc.ount, whi1ch I
was p·ermitted to draw against. That e;ondition
did not exist during all the time I was married to
Mr. Giles. We traded the ranch in 1929 and sold
the sheep. I think it was in O-ctober of that year.
From October, 1929, Mr. Giles was farming the
Lake Creek farm. That fa.rn1 belonged to me.
He didn't earn much money on the farm. I knew
he borrowed money fr,om the bank but did not
kno\v how much. I do not know that the borrowed
money wa.s used ror our living, but we lived onI drew on the money f.or one year, that is, until
.1930. '' (Ab. 169)
IShe further testified :
'·'After we traded the farm, we kept the sheep
for awhile. Then they were sold. I think probably we sold the sheep before the farm * * *
I had the sheep before I got the farm. Harold had
charge of the .sheep until I got the farm. Mr.
,Giles took care of the sheep while they were on
the . farm. * * * I think n~o~w we sold the
sheep before we sold the farm.'' (Ab. 170)
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She testified further:
"I stated that I received a!hout $4,000.00 frou1
the sheep. 'That was the sheep that Harold Giles
"\Yas running in 19·26 to the fail of 1929. I am not
sure but tha.t \Ye sold the sheep before the farm.
It could have 'been in 19'28 when we sold them. We
paid that money to the Bank of Heber City. That
is the best recoJlection I have now. I know we
paid the money \Ye got from the sheep to the Bank
of Heber City. The money was paid on the debts
we had acquired, that is, my husband and I. *
* * I didn't know how much money Harold
l1ad borrowed from the bank. ·The debt had to be
settled, and I ''as willing to. use the money for
that purpose. I do not know what p·art of the
twenty-six hundred vvent to the bank. I didn't
turn the money over to the bank. My husband
took ~are of that. I gave him the money.'' ( Ab.
171-172)

On this point, she testified further:
''I do not kno.w how my husband used the money.
He c.ould have used it in a cheeking account. I
don't kno\v. 1 don't recall ever asking him how
he used the money. I really don't know whether
he used any of it in a checking account. I went
to the hank and had him cash some checks f,o~r
me and wrote other ehecks. * * * 'There was
no money in the ihank that he could have drawn
against after 19'30. If there had been money after
1930, I would have felt free to draw against that
account." ·(.Ab. 174)
Notwith8tanding there

w~as

no money 1n the hank to

draw :O•n after 19'30, still they •continued their joint busiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

56
ness ventures. Wor example, see j.oint notes executed by
them to the Moultons ,in 1931--..Complaint in E'xhibit 1.
The hushand, Harold, made a .signilficant "Showing.
In his sworn answer, respeeting the water certificates,
he Haid:
"D~efendant admits that said certificates of stock
were in the name of defendant Josie Baird Giles
and that said certificates of .sto~ck were endorsed
in bla:nk .on the ha0k of said certificates by said
defendant, Josie Baird ~Giles, a long time prior
to this transaction.'' (iAfb. 12-13 )'

The transfer referred .to was the pledging of the
certifieates to the hank in 19·33. Hi~s answer further alleges (Ah. 13) that the certinca tes were obtained by the
bank in 1'9'33 by false representations and fraudulent
conduct.
When put on the stand to support his story. he testified, on his dire-ct examination, that. he delivered the
stock to the bank in 19,29, not 1933, and that he did not
know whether his wife had told him he might pledge them
in 19:29 or not.
·1;he undisputed re-cord shnws that the exa.ct date o.f
the pledge was May 2'1, 1'9'2:9 ('Tr. 17'9, Ab. 150). This
pledge is therefore prior to tlie sale of the land and water
to Vern or. B:aird, and prior to the mo.rtgage back to Josie
and prior to ·every other transaction mentioned in either
ca.se.

s.o the

question, was Harold authoriz.ed to pledge

the certificates, remains paramount.
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His dirert testim-ony on the point is so brief that
we quote it in full from the trans~cript.
Questions by Judge Hansen:
'· Q. Are you at this trial resisting the action
against you J?

''A. Why, I am resisting it against -my 'vife, nort
against me. I don't care what they do to me.
''Q. You did file an answer, through Mr. ~forgan,
y;our attorney?

"A. Yes.
'' Q. I will ask you, Mr. ·Giles, if you now have an
independent recollection of delivering to the
bank of Heber ·City tw-o certificates of stock?

''A. y es, srr.
.
'·'·Q. I "~ll show them to you so that JIOU will
know which ones they are. One is marked
Defendants' Exhibit G, Certificate No. 68, in
·Cau~e No. 1266. Will you examine tfllat.
The other is Defendants' Exhibit F, in case
No. 1266. Let's see, they are each for 241/2
shares, I believe'
"A yr es.
•

_l_

''Q. Have you a recollecti·on no\v, Mr. Giles, as to
when those certificates were delivered to the
Bank of Heber City~
''A. Well, I don't kno\v exactly. It "\Vas some time
in '29.

"Q. You think it "\Yas some time in '29. At the
time you delivered those two certificates to
the Bank ;o.f Helber City, did your wife Josie
Giles tell you that you might so deliver them
to the Bank of Heber City'
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

58

''A. I don't know.
'·' Q. Have you any recollection about that nowf
, , A.
...tl..

N o.

J'UD~GE

HAN.SE!N:

"I think that is all.'' (Tr.

293-4)
·The foregoing testimony 0onstitutes all the direct
resistance put up by H·arold to the case against his wife.
The iCircumstanees under which he delivered the water
certifiea.tes to the bank, ho-vvever, were brought out on
cross-examination, and as abstracted by his counsel,
read as foll:o.-yvs:
"I delivered the certificates to the hank in
1'929. I remember that. I received possessiion
of the certifi-cates at the hon1e. I just took them
to the ha!nk. I wa.s in the habit of dealing with
1ny \vife 's property. I never had any -conversation with my -vvife about dealing with her property. I handled the property that she inherited.
I talked to her ·s-ome about the property .. I heard
her testify about drawing on the account and she
did dra\\T on the acc.oun t. I managed the farm.
·T.here was water on the farm and the water \Vas
represented by the ~certificates. I have seen the
eertific.ates at the hon1e. I am not certain when
the certifi·cates can1e into ·my \Yife 's posse·ssion,
·but I think it was some time in 1927. I had the
·certificates several times I guess. I do nl()t know·
that she ever had kno\vledge that they were in my
possession. 'They \Yere just around the home. I
don't know that I ever had them in n1y possession
to her kno\vledge. I had no discussion with her
at the time I took the certificates to the bank.
I don't remember whet.her she \vas home at that
tin1e or not. I took the certificates to the hank
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because I thought 've were in business partnership-:'\vas married, and I was doing her business.
I thoug·ht 've "~ere partners. The signature on
Exhibit F looks like her sig11ature and I would
say it is her sig·nature. 'The signature ·on Exhibit
iG does not look like her signature. It was there
when I took it to the ba_nk. I do not know who
wrote that signature. I d·on '·t think it is mY '\vriting, but it could be. It isn't my ,vife 's handwriting· a.ny,-ray." (Ab. 175-6)
The reco:r:d, a.s made by the defenda:nts thems.elves,
esta·blishes a business and p1~operty status between Josie
and Harold Giles, \Yhich is so clear and c.onvincing th~t
none can mistake its existence and character.
William Baird, the broth·er, says that Josie and
Harold were in business together. That Josie got some .
sheep for the express purpose of building up a business.
That they had range land a.nd water and were in fact
in the sheep business together .
.J1oisie called the business her husband's businessthe .sheep ·business and the ranch business, to which she
contributed both the sheep and the ranch. What he contributed in money or property does not appear, but he
did give his whole time, a.ttention, and skill to the management of the business. There was no provis~o~n f.or
wages ·or eompensation for Harold's .services. The proceeds from the business and the pr.operty used in the
business were used indisc.riminately by Josie and H:arold
to pay their living expenses and their husiness debts.
J.osie gave him an ahs,o.lute free hand. She did not
know what he wa.s doing with the sheep or the ranch or
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the money ~e was getting. She was content to know
that .he was providing for her and allowing her to draw
against the hank account. When it came to selling and
trading .and paying business ~o·bligations, Josie's characteristic remarks were: ''We traded the farm;'' ''We sold
the sheep;'' ''We sold the farm;'' ''We paid the bank;''
''We paid the debt my husband and I had acquired.''
It was, therefore, no idle conclusion on Harold's
part, when he said : ''I thought we were partners.''
The record is replete with evidence of Josie's acquiesoence in Harold's borrowing fr1om the hank, which
she .treated as her own obligation.
·Even her counsel at the trial, by the form of their
questions, trearted Harold's obligations as Josie's obligatitons. Beginning on page 96 of the transcript, Josie
is testifying to the sale of a house. These questions and
answers appear :

''·Q. What did
~ceived

you do with the money you refrom that house~

'''A. We had to pay bank bills with it.
'·' Q. What bank did you

owe~

'·'A. He'ber City Bank.'' ('Tr. 9·6-97)
See also Tr. 12·2 and 1!2:3. She testified that she sold 195
ewes and 3 bucks and the money went for expenses, m0:st
of it to the Bank of He~ber City ('Tr. 121, 122, 131, Ab.
139, 141}.
'' Q. Whose notes were they~
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'• A. ·They were notes my husband had signed for
running the ibusiness. '' (Tr. 131)

In view of all the foregoing

transa~ctions,

it is well
nigh impossible to treat the handling of the water certificates as unauthorized. Josie drew most of the money
that went into the hank ('Tr. 198, Ah. 153). Harold bor"
rowed $1700.00, May 21, 1929, and made many renewals
until the $25·50.00 note sued on was given in 1933. Harold
Giles borrowed from the bank constantly from September, 1926, down to the time of the ple(J.ge agreement of
May 21, 19'29, and some of the notes evidencing the in- .
debtedness were signed by Josie. (See Tr. 249, Ab. 165- ·
166 and Plaintiffs' Exhibit 13 introduced by stipula.tion).
During the time when Josie admits Harold wa.s running
the business, the notes generally were signed by Harold
and not by Josie. The certificates as pledged were endorsed.

Josie would not testify that the signature on

Certificate N·o. 68 was in Harold's handwriting ('Tr. 260,
2~61,

.A!h. 168).

On the question of the handwriting on

the certifi·cates of stock, we submit that the signature
on certificate No. 64 was placed there by Josie herself.
ISee comparison with her signature given at the trial on
Exhibit B-3 and her .signa.ture on the pleading~.

The

handwriting on certificate Nlo. 68 appear.s very likely to
have been Harold's.

He testi:fied that it might be his

signature ('Tr. 299, Ab. 176). Compare his signature on
Exhibit B-1, which is his promissory note sued on in case

No. 1266, and his signa.ture on the pleadings.
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Harold was asked whe~ther or not a.t the time tlie
two certifieates were delivered to the bank his wife told
him he could deliver the certificates. He stated, (Tr.
294-2.9'9, Afb. 1715, 176):

''A. I don't know.''
When asked how he got possession of the certificates,
he stated:
''A. Why they were home, I just took them to the
bank.
'' Q. Were you in the habit :of dealing with your
wife's property1

"A. Y e·s. ' '
* * * * * * *
'·'Q. Did you have the management of the property tha't she inherited 1

''A. Yes.
''·Q. And you never talked with her about the
m·a.nagement of the property 1
"A. ·Oh, .some, but I don't know what she said.

'·''Q. But you were the ma:nager, and you heard
her testimony ho.w she drew on your account1

"A.Ye.s.
"Q. ·And that is the fact;is it1

''A. Yes.''

* * * * * * *
'' Q. You managed the farm did you~
"A. Yes."
*

* * * * * *
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"Q ...A.nd 'vas there 'vater 'vith the f·arm?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Do you know whether or not that water was
represented by any certificates'~
"A. Yes.
'' Q. Had you seen the certificates o?

''A. Yes.
'·'·Q. Where had you seen

them~

''A. Home.''
* * * * * * *
"Q. In '2·7. Did you ever have them in your possessi:o:n ~ I mean did she ever deliver them
over into your possession~

''A. I had them several times I guess.
'' Q. With her

knowledge~

''A. Well, I don't know if it was her knowledge.
Just like you would .have anything else
around home.''

*

* * * * * *
''Q. Then state under what cir,cumstance-s you
took them, and by what right you took
them.''

*

*

*

*

*

* *
''A. Well, I took them to the bank beeause I
thought we were in business partnership, was
married, and I was doing her :business.

,,, Q. You thought you were

partners~

''A. Yes.
'' Q. I will ask you to look at Defendants' Exhibit
'F ', at the signature on .the hack thereof, and
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see whether or not you recognize that signature.
''A. It looks like her .signature.

'·'Q. Would you say it is her signature?
''lA. Yes.'' ('Tr. 29'5-299)

Harold testified that while the signature on Certificate N·o. 68 did not look like her .signature it was on
there when he took it to the hank ('Tr. 299, .&b. 176).
Appellants seem to think that respondents rely upon
estoppel to establish their right to the water as against
J-osie Baird Giles. In this they are mistaken. Our case
rests on clear principles of agency.
The manner in which an agency may arise is clearly
shown by the following authorities:
,., Apparent authority, or ostensible authority, as
it is also called, is that whi,ch, though not actually
granted, the principal knowingly permits the
.agent to exercise, or which he holds him out as
possessing. Accordingly, .as defined by the American Law Institute, an appearent agent is one
who, with or without authority, reasonably appears to third persons. to be authorized to act as
the agent of another.
''With respect to the derivation of the agent's
apparent authority to begin with, the power and
authority of an agent may safely he deemed by
.persons dealing with him in good faith to be at
least equal to the s-cope of the duties ordinarily
conferred upon agents or agencies of that character. Apparent authority may also be, and often
is., derived from a course of dealing or from the
.fiact that a number of acts similar to the: one in
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question "'rere assented to, ratified, or not disavowed by the principal. The acquiescence of the
principal in an extension of his authority by an
agent in the transaction in question may be suffieient to create the appearance of authority in the
agent to do such act ; the acquiescence in, and
consequent seope of, such authority, is to be determined not only by what the .principal a-ctually
does kn·O"\Y of the acts of the agent 'vithin the employment~ but also as to "\vhat he. should, in the:
exercise of ordinary care and prudence, know the
agent is doing in the agency transaction. In
such ease, the appearance of authority is C!eated
because of the fact that the third person is
entitled to assume that the principal i.s cognizant
.of the exercise of authority and would forbid
it if it were unauthorized. As stated by the
American Law Institute, ex-cept for the execution
of instruments under .seal, or for the conduct of
transactions required by statute to be authorize-d
in a particular w.ay, apparent authority to do
an act may be created by written or spoken words
or any other conduct of the principal which, reasona'bly interpreted, causes a third person to
beli·eve that the prin,cipal consents to have the act
dl(}ne on his behalf by the person purporting to
aet for him. It is also to be noti·ced that the
actual instructions of the principal to the agent
do not govern the case, unless the p·erson dealing
with him had notice or was put upon inquiry as
to his real authority. Stated inclusively, then,
the rule is that if a principal, acts or conducts
his busine-ss, either intentionally or in a negligent
manner~ or fails to disapprove of the agent's act
or course -of action, and thereby leads the public
t<> believe that his agent possesses authority to
act or contract in the name of the prin({ipal, such
principal is bound by the .acts of the agent within
the ~scope of his apparent authority as to any
,person who, upon th-e faith of such holding out~
believes, and has reasonable gr.ound to believe,
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that the agent has ~such authority, and in good
faith deals with him.'' ( 2 Am. J. pages 82-84, Sec.
101-103).
The following statement is taken from the case of

Dierkes v. Hauxlvurst L.and Comp·wny, 80 N. J. Law 369,
79 Atl. 361, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 693 at Page 696:
''And, as the fact of agency and the extent of
the authority are matters peculiarly within the
knowledge of the defendant, the .courts have not
compelled plaintiff t~o call hostile witnesses to
prove this element of his ·Case, but it may be inferred from certain facts and circumstances that
would fairly give rise· to such an inference. It
is ·stated in 31 Cyc. L.aw & Proc. p. 1662, that,
'as a general rule, the fact of agency cannot be
established by proof of the acts of the pretended
agent, in the absence ·of ·evidence tending to show
the principal ',s knnwledge of such acts, or as.sent
to them. Yet when the acts are of such a .character, and so ·continued, as to justify an inference
that the principal knew of them, and would not
have permitted the san1e if unauthorized, the
acts themselves are competent evidence of
agency.' This, it will he observed, is not on the
theory of e~stop_pel in favor of a party contracting
with the supposed agent hecause the .conduct of
the principal amounted to holding him out as
·such .agent, but is a rule of evidence, permitting
a jury to find agency as a fact and not merely
estoppel to ~deny it. And, while the question has
arisen for the most part in contract cases, the
rule has als-o been applied in actio-n of tort.''
See also Restatement of the Law of Agency, Volume

1, Section 31, Comment on Sub-section (1): a; Section
43, Comment a and ·C; Section 159, Oomment a, b, and e.

~: 2.JLc.. 3- 'J..,3~,

'4.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

67
Assume for the purpose of arg·ument that Josie
did not kno"\Y that Harold ""'"as pledging the "\Vater stock.
\Yould she haYe objected had she kno,vn? There is nothing in the evidence indicating that she would have.
,,. .hen she did learn that the stock \Yas pledged she
tnade nn effort to reclaim it. She merely sought to
\"'erify the existenee of the pledge.
The stock "\Yas pledged in 1929. Josie ,says that
she learned about it first "~bile she was in California.
She n1oved to California in 1931. ( Tr. 98; A b. 134). She
made inquiries at the Bank of Heber City and at the
Federal Reserve Bank "\Yhen she returned to Utah in

1933. ,,. .e may now note the purpose of the inquiries
as disclosed by the transcript beginning at page 254:

''Q. ':Vhat did

~.Ir.

Draper say to you at that

time-?
''A. He said they had the certificates all right,
they had been presented to the hank. And
I told him I didn't think so. An:d he said,
well, he did. ..A. nd I asked hil n if \Ye could
see them, and he said they were in Salt Lake.
I thought he said that the Federal Reserve
bad taken them :over''
Inquiry was made at the Federal Reserve and request
to see the certificates was made, but they were in a
vault and not available.

'' Q. After you receive-d that information, did you
do anything further with respect to that
matter, trying to find out about these certificates J?
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''A. No. I. think that was the last ·time I tried
to get to see them.'' (Tr. 255).
By her own testimony Josie had nothing in mind
except to see whether her husband had really pledged
the .stock.
Thus matters stood till August 14, 1934, when the
Bank Commissioner filed an action seeking to foreclose
the Bank's lien on the certificates.
J·osie filed a separate answer in this case. (Ab. 7-11).
To the allegations in the ·Complaint that Harold had
pledged the eerti:ficate, she merely answered that she
knew nothing about it. (Ab. 8).
Following the institution of this action, the matter
stood without ·anything being done until November 15,
1938, when the Moultons brought a suit against Vernor
Baird et al., seeking to foreclose a mortgage on certain
real estate, including the water certifi·cates held by the
bank. In this suit, Josie again filed a ~separate answer,
(Ab. 50) but nowhere in it does she allege that Harold
wrongfully pledged the ·certificates to the bank in May,
1929.

The Moultons alleged in their complaint, para-

graph 9 (Ab. 32) that Harold delivered the certificates
to the bank after October 10, 1929, ''without the knowledge or ·Consent of the rightful owners thereof.'' This
allegation Josie admits, but makes no other allegation
concerning the matter. The proof shows without dispute
that Harold delivered the stock to the bank before Octoher 10, 1929, to wit, .on May 21, 1929. (Tr. 294; Ab. 175).
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Josie knew at all thues after October, 1933, that the
bank ~laimed a lien ~on the certiflcates, yet neither she
nor her alleged successors in interest made any attempt
to repossess the stock or to have the lien declared invalid by any court.
The Moultons were the first to challenge the bank's
lien in 1938. It was not until the case had been tried
that Josie asked leave to re-open and challenge the
bank's lien. This she did December 13, ·1939. (Ab. 22).
In her petition for re-opening the case, she claims t·he
water as ag·ainst all other claimants on the ground that
it was used "to irrigate their homestead." "Their"
meaning the homestead of Josie and Harold. Even h·ere
she fails to allege that Harold was without authority
to pledge the stock as of May 21, 1929, or at any other
time. There she ~says :

"J. Harold Giles was without authority to s-ell or
hypothecate the same without the ·consent, approval and execution of a lien by your petitioner
Josie Baird Giles.''
.When this allegation was made the court had already
annouced from the bench his finding that she had consented to and approved the pledge, so she alleged a new
requirement to the validity of the Bank's lien, to wit:
''Execution of a lien by'' her~self.
The homestead angle of the case having been argued
heretofore, we now merely ·Call .attention to the fact that
from 1933 to 1939, Josie, with full knowledge of the
B'ank's claim of lien, made no challe:nge ·against said
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lien, and put forth no .eff~a:rt to rec:over it. She did
not ever say that the stock had been wrongfully pledged.
The most she ever said was that if it had been pledged
she didn't know anything a'bout it. But it was pledged
and she knew it for six year.s without -challenging it.
How could she~ She joined her husband in business.
She left the entire management of the business to him.
l-Ie had to borrow money to run the business. This she
knew, and this .she acquiesced in. She shared the procee·ds of the loans. She recognized the debts as her own
by helping to pay them. To the very end she breathed
no word of impropriety against Harold's conduct of the
business. She didn't even charge _,him with bad judgment. He was a good husband; what was his, was her.s
always. She drew on the hank account without let or
hinderance, and stopped drawing only because ther~e was
no more money to draw.
Their business was a combination of ranch, water
and sheep. The money borrowed was to further the
busine.ss. Can it be doubted in face of all the foregoing
that Harold had full authority to do all that was necessary to be done to further the business including the
pledging of the business property to seeure business
loans.
We think not. If Josie •SO put her affairs in the
hands of her husband, Harold, as to give the appearance
that he had authority to pledge the water certificates
standing in her name, the Bank holds those certificates
free from her equities. Ga.rfield Banking Co1npany v~
Argyle, 64 U. 572; 232 P. 541.
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In effect, appellants argue that even if an agency
or partnership is established, still there wa.s no authority
to rene'v the note and pledg·e of May 21, 1929, in 1933,
which renewal of 1933 was sued on by the Bank ·Commissioner. This is not so. See, Interstate Trust Company'~_;\ Headhtnd, 51 U. 543,171 P. 515·; Gray v. J(app·os,
90 U. 300,61 P. (2d) 613; Key v. Thomas Lyons Co.,
198 P. 928 and Healy v. Gino.ff, 220 P. 539.
Again appellants argue (Appellants' Brief 17):
'''The la ",. is well settled that since certificates of
stock a:ve not negotiable instruments, a transferee
acquires no better ti tie than his transferor had
unless the circumstances are such as to create an
estoppel in his favor. It £ollow.s that a transfer
of a cert~fieate of stock, even to a bona fide purchaser or pledgee by one who hH.s no title or
authority to transfer the same, gives the transferee no title to the stock as against the true
owner unless the latter is for some reason, estopped to assert his title, or except in those jurisdictions which have .adopted the Uniform Stock
Transfer A·ct. (Citing authorities). In the absence of a statute the law announced in the foregoing text and cases .seems to be well settled and
to the effect that shares of stock represented by a
·Certificate are in the main suhject to the same
rules of law that apply to the sale of personal
property, and that certificates are not in any sense
negotiable instruments. We do not ha:ve the Uni£orm Transfer Act, * * *.''
This whole argument falls simply because it is not
true. We do have the U ni£orm Transfer Act. See
Chapter 55, Laws of Utah, 1927, and Chapter 3 of Title
18, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933.
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The very first section of this act

provid~s

:

'' Ti tie to a ·certificate and to shares reprethereby -can he transferred only:

~sented

"1. By delivery of the certificate indorsed
~either in blank * * * by the p,erson appearing
by the ·certificate to be the owner of the shares
rep-resented thereby;''
''Stock shall be .deemed personal property.''
18-2-33, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933.
''Water stock is no different from any other
~stock." George v. Robi,son, 23 U. 79; 63 P. 819;
Supply Ditch Company v. Elliott, 15 P. 691
(Colo·.); O'Ma.ra v. New.comb, 88 P. 167 (Colo.).
Appellants argue that the deliv-ery of the certificates to the Bank in this case were unauthorized and
that the endorsement on Certificate No. 68 was forged.
(Appellants' Brief 19·).
We have already shown how completely Harold was
· authoriz·ed to pledge the !stock, which includes, of ne.ces•sity, all the acts nece'Ss·ary to effectuate the pledge,
which would include endorsing the eertifi.cates. Mani. festly, J,osie ·endors-ed ·certificate No. 64, and manifestly
Harold endorsed the .other. N:o one denies that Harold
·endorsed No. ·68. He admitted that it might be his
writing. (Tr. 300; Ab. 176). ·Compare this endorse, nient with hi,s signature on Exhibit B-1.
"While it is said to be usual and better that an
agent's signature should appear upon the instrument yet this is not in all ~cases necessary, and
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cipal may effe.ctually bind him by simply affixing
the name of ~such principal as if it were his own."
2 C. J. S. 1348, Sec. 2, and case.s cited.
''As a general rule an instrument should recite
the power under which the agent acts unless the
intention to execute the power appears from the
instrument or the surrounding' circumstances.''
2 ·C. J. S. 1354, Sec. 132.
F:vom the foregoing it ap·pears that the pledge by
Harold was in all respects legal and binding, and we
observe that it makes no difference in this case whether
the certificates be treated as negotiable. instruments or
mere personal property. If Harold had mortgaged the
sheep to secure a loan-instea~d of pledging the certificate,
the question would still be: Did he have the authority~
Having fully proved the i~ssue as to the certificates
in the affirmative, we submit that the decree of the lower
court should stand.
Merely to p-reserve our rights we call attention t<>:
Page 9 of Appellants' Brief, paragraph 7, where a ques.;,
tion is raised .as to the effect of the use of the water on
the farm as against the rights of the bank which held the
certificates of stock. Thi,s question is not argued in the
Brief and we presume therefore that it is waived and
.will not be eonsidered by the Court. We call attention
however to the Transcript, page 324 and pages 328 and
329, where it appears that the wa.ter repres:ented by the
certificates was ·Conveyed to the .corporation. The company was therefore not a mutual eomp-any where the
stockholders remain the owners of the wate.r., The waters
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in thi,s instance were actually conveyed to the corporation and ·Certificates issued to stoekholders.

Seotion 100-1-10, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933 provides:
"Water rights shall be transferred by deed
in substantially the same manner .as real estate
except when they are repre~sented by shares of
stock in a .corporation;''
It seems to us that under the Utah law there ·Can be no
adverse use under the facts in this case. Water stock is
personal property as heretofore shown. However, we
shall not pursue this point further for the reason that
it is not argued by appellants.
Resp·ectfully submitted,
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